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PREFACE

Every morning as I arrive at the foot of the Metro Center escalator, music floats
down to me from the keyboard of a talented player on the street above. The
musician remained a nameless but much appreciated fixture until October 26,
1993, when my colleague Louise Howells stormed into my office, outraged. She
had just watched the keyboard player's arrest and handcuffing by three transit
authority police officers. Two police vehicles had carted the "music man" away.
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The music man, Philip Smallwood, was charged with a violation of the District
of Columbia's new "Aggressive Panhandling" statute.' In the first seven months
since the law's enactment, four hundred twenty-one (421) people have been
2
arrested under its provisions.
Mr. Smallwood works very hard and never asks anyone for money. His
livelihood depends upon his voice and his instrument. Yet on the day of the arrest,
Mr. Smallwood was told by police that if he wanted a trial, his keyboard would be
seized as an "instrumentality" of the crime. His other option was to pay $50 and
forfeit his trial. Mr. Smallwood paid.
I filed a motion to set aside Mr. Smallwood's forfeiture, based on his
constitutional and factual defenses in the case and the fact that he had not had the
advice of counsel when he made the forfeiture. A judge of the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia granted the motion, and Mr. Smallwood will have his
trial in a few weeks after the Corporation Council initiates prosecution.8
Mr. Smallwood's case is more than the defense of one man. His arrest has
mushroomed into a planned law suit seeking declaratory relief on behalf of Mr.
Smallwood and others who have been arrested or who may be arrested under
various unconstitutional provisions of this statute. The suit will be brought by
lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Washington Legal
Clinic for the Homeless, and two law firms. We also intend to propose
amendments to the Council of the District of Columbia to cure the legal defects in
4
the law.

1. D.C. CODE ANN § 22-3311 (Supp. 1994).
2. Letter from Fred Thomas. District of Columbia Chief of Police, to Councilmembcr James
Nathanson, April !1, 1994 (responding to questions raised by the Councilmember in a letter dated March 23,
1994). D.C: Police Chief Thomas also reported that only eleven of the individuals arrested for Aggressive
Panhandling were represented or had the assistance of counsel. (copy on file with DC L REV).
3. On April 12, 1994. Mr. Smallwood was arrested again for the same charge by six transit authority
officers. This time he was jailed overnight and his keyboard seized as an "instrumentality" of crime. Trial is
pending. See Steve Twomey, Silenced by Metro's Sad Refrain, \vSlt PosT, April 18. 1994. at BI (reporting
arrest).
4. The Panhandling Control Act of 1993. D.C BiLL No 10-72, initially was passed by the Council of
the District of Columbia as a congressional recess emergency bill and was approved by Mayor Sharon Pratt
Kelly on July 16, 1993. The permanent DC. ACT No 10-98, became effective November 17, 1993 (codified at
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3311-3316 (Supp. 1994)).
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INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 1993, the Council of the District of Columbia adopted the
"Panhandling Control Act of 1993," joining twenty-six other states5 that have
enacted legislation prohibiting begging in some form. 6 Part I of this article
examines policy and social rationales put forth by the D.C. law's proponents. Part
II describes free speech issues implicated by the new statute. Part III discusses
constitutional and other legal challenges to the statute. Specific sections of the
statute are analyzed in the context of the declaratory relief lawsuit. Part IV
proposes an alternative statute that cures these legal defects. Part V describes the
societal context in which the proposed legislation is offered.

L

POLICY AND SOCIAL REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE STATUTE

Business and community groups, as well as individual citizens, in public
meetings and letters to members of the Council of the District of Columbia voiced
support for a law prohibiting aggressive panhandling. Oral and written testimony
in support of the proposed legislation was also offered.' Proponents of the

5. See Michael M. Burns, Fearing the Mirror: Responding to Beggars In a Kinder and Gentler
America, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 783, 810, n.142 (1992) (listing begging statutes, broken down by

categories, such as, "accosting a person for purposes of begging"). Burns also lists eleven additional states
which give the power to local government to regulate begging.
6. The District had previously prohibited begging in D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3302(6) (1981) (repealed by
Panhandling Control Act of 1993), which provided that "any person wandering abroad and begging, or who
goes about from door to door or places himself in or on any highway, passage or other public place to beg or
receive alms" is a "vagrant," and is subject to fine and imprisonment. This 1941 law had been held invalid in
Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and had not been enforced for more
than twenty years. In 1990, enforcement was resumed and numerous arrests were made. See Panhandling
Control Act. 1991: Roundtable Hearing on D.C. BILL No. 9-80 Before the Judiciary Committee of the
Council of the District of Columbia, July 10, 1991 p.2 -3 (statement of Arthur B. Spitzer, ACLU of the
National Capital Area) [hereinafter ACLU Testimony] (early version of the aggressive panhandling law).
7. See Letter from Sara Maddux, Chairperson, Advisory Neighborhood Commission 2A to
Councilmember Nathanson, March 10, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from R. Dennis Bass, Chairman,
Advisory Neigborhood Commission 2B to Councilmember Nathanson, February 3, 1993 (supporting
legislation); Letter from Charles R. Braum, Chairman, Advisory Neigborhood Commission 3F to
Councilmember Nathanson, March 1, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Emily Durso Vetter,
President, Hotel Association of Washington to Councilmember Nathanson, February I, 1992 (supporting
legislation); Letter from Art Carlson, Golden Triangle Business Association, to Councilmember Nathanson,
February 5, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Kyle Pitson, President, Dupont Circle Citizen's
Association to Councilmember Nathanson, May 6, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Kingdon Gould,
III, President, Pennsylvania Quarter Neighborhood Association to Councilmember Nathanson, May 7, 1993
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legislation raised four related concerns: public safety, quality of life, prevention of

fraud, and economics.
Public safety concerns centered on the behavior of panhandlers who block the

way of pedestrians or otherwise interfere with them, who stop traffic to beg or to
wash windows, and who identify and save parking spaces in return for money.8
Proponents argued that these types of conduct pose a danger to pedestrians and
drivers in the District. Quality of life issues raised by proponents of the legislation
included the fear and intimidation experienced by tourists and residents particularly women, the elderly and families - when accosted by aggressive
panhandlers.9 Proponents further argued that the legislation would prevent fraud
by countering the deceit and exploitation practiced by "professional" panhandlers
against caring citizens. 10 Finally, proponents raised the concern that the
perceptions of citizens and tourists of diminished public safety and quality of life
in the District of Columbia had a negative economic effect on the city."

(supporting legislation). Letter from Edward S. Grandis. Executive Director. Dupont Circle Merchants and
Professional Association to Councilmember Nathanson. May 10. 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from
Shirley Robinson Hall. Chairperson. Washington Convention Center to Councilmember Nathanson. May 12,
1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Barbara Freidman, Owner. Mystery Books to Councilmember
Nathanson, May 28. 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Ronald G. Eberhardt to Councilmember
Nathanson. June 2, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from William L. Campbell. Jr. to Councilmember
Nathanson. May 25. 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Edward A. Dent to Councilmember
Nathanson. May 5, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter to James A. Folliod to Councilmembcr Nathanson,
May 11, 1993 (supporting legislation); Letter from Nicholas A. Addams to Councilmembr Nathanson. June
2,1993 (supporting legislation) (on file with D C L REv); Panhandling Control Act. 1991: Hearings on DC
BILL No. 9-80 Before the Judiciary Committee of the Council of the District of Columbia. July 10. 1991
(written statement by Gregory Doherty, Business and Professional Association of Georgetown; Tom Roland,
Executive Vice-President, Restaurant Association of Metropolitan Washington; Don Denton. President,
Washington DC Association of Realtors; Linda Barnes Capitol Hill Association of Merchants and
Professionals; John S. Monagan, District of Columbia resident (supporting legislation)); (statement by Don
Denton, President, Washington D.C. Association of Realtors; Thomas Ward, President. Citizens Association
of Dupont Circle; L.L. Len, Citizens Federation; Emily Vetter, Executive Vice-President, Hotel Association of
Washington, D.C.; and John S. Monagan, District of Columbia resident) (supporting legislation).
8. See Letter from Edward Dent to Councilmember Nathanson, May 5, 1993 (on file with DC L
REv.).
9. See Letter from R. Dennis Bass, Chairman, Dupont Circle ANC 2B. to Councilmembr Nathanson,
June 7, 1993 (on file with D.C L REv).
10. See Panhandling Control Act, 1991: Roundtable Hearing Before the Judiciary Committee of the
Council of the District of Columbia, July 10, 1991 (statement by Gregory Doherty, Chairman, Community
Safety Committee, Business & Professional Association of Georgetown) (supporting DC BILL No 9-80)
[hereinafter Public Roundtable].
11. See Letter from William Campbell to Councilmember to Nathanson, May 25, 1993 (on file with
D.C. L. REv.). "There are some who say, 'ifI am going to pay high rents and high taxes, I want to live
somewhere safe, private and nice,' and these people will move; thus denying the District of needed tax revenue
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Aggressive panhandling was the number one complaint in one advisory
neighborhood commission."2 It was also cited as the key factor in the decreasing
patronage of many downtown businesses, which in turn resulted in job loss for
employees of those businesses, significant lost sales revenues to business operators,
and, ultimately, lost income, sales, and property tax revenues to the District."
Proponents of the panhandling control statute requested that the law be passed
and strictly enforced in order to "send a message to people that this kind of
behavior wil no longer be tolerated and that we are reclaiming our streets for law
4
abiding citizens."'
The Judiciary Committee of the Council of the District of Columbia considered
the proposed legislation at its meeting on May 12, 1993. The councilmembers'
concerns mirrored the views of their constituents. One councilmember referred to a
public "besieged by an army of mendicants"' 5 and feeling "hassled, annoyed,
harassed [and] sometimes assaulted."' 6 The councilmembers further noted that
aggressive panhandling was "mortally wounding some small businesses 1 7 and
having "a negative impact on tourism, on business [and] on customers." 18 Public
safety issues were also raised, particularly regarding panhandlers who interfered
with traffic.' 9
In spite of these concerns, the committee members expressed real discomfort
with some implications of the proposed bill. Their discomfort was evident in the
June 1, 1993, committee hearing when the Legislative Session of the full Council
convened to consider the proposed panhandling measure. Some councilmembers
feared that the law would be seen as anti-homeless20 and as permission to jail the

and the stability of a strong and large middle class."
12. See Letter from R. Dennis Bass, Chairman, Dupont Circle ANC 2B to Councilmember Nathanson,
February 13, 1993 (on file with D.C. L. REv.).
13. See Letter from Nicholas A. Addams to Councilmember Nathanson, June 4, 1993 (on file with D.C.
L. REv.). "It has been said hundreds of times over, that aggressive panhandlers are responsible for a large part
of the downturn in retail and restaurant sales, which translates into lost revenue for these businesses, which of
course translates into loss of sales tax and other dollars to the city." (emphasis in original). Id.
14. See supra note 8.
15. Panhandling Control Act of 1993: Meeting of the Judiciary Committee of the Council of the
District of Columbia, May 12, 1993, p.15 (statement by Councilmember Brazil) (on file with DC. L. REV.).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 17.
18. Id.
19. Councilmember Nathanson said "there is no constitutional right to panhandle in the street portion
of a public right-of-way. . . that people do not have, and it's based on public safety.d.." d. at 39.
20. See Tenth Legislative Session of the Council of the District of Columbia, June 1, 1993, p. 4 5
(statement of Councilmember Evans) (on file with D.C. L REV.).
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poor or mentally ill for begging.2 1 Others worried that the law might penalize
people for working, particularly those offering small services like pumping gas or
window washing in exchange for donations. 22 In addition to these perceptions,
several councilmembers raised concerns about the legality of some provisions of
the law.3 Nevertheless, the law was passed by voice vote with only one
councilmember asking to have his vote recorded as no.2 ' Councilmembers stated
repeatedly, if somewhat inaccurately, that panhandling was legitimized for the
first time in this legislation 5 and that only "aggressive" panhandling was outlawed
by its enactment.ae The legislators spoke of the need to address the underlying
social problems that caused panhandling,27 but they justified the legislation as an
effort to strike a balance between the needs of panhandlers and those of the rest of
the community 28 and to establish an "acceptable standard of behavior on our
streets." 20

IL

FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTrrUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The District's Aggressive Panhandling law derives almost entirely from model
legislation prepared by Robert Teir, 0 General Counsel of the American Alliance
For Rights and Responsibilities.sl In turn, Teir's model legislation was based on

21. See id. at 10 and 83 (statements of Councilmember Thomas); Id. at 46 (statement of
Councilmember Evans); id. at 67 (statement of Councilmember Mason); Id. at 81 (statement of
Councilmember Barry). See also discussion infra part V.
22. See id. at 54 (statement of Councilmember Lightfoot).
23. See id. at 40 (statement of Councilmember Smith); id. at 73 (statement of Councilmember Ray);
id. at 80 (statement of Councilmember Barry). See also discussion Infra parts i and Ill.
24. Id. at 104 (Councilmember Thomas voted no).
25. See supra note 6.
26. See Tenth Legialatve Session of the Council of the District of Columbia. June 1, 1993. p.27

(statement of Councilmember Nathanson); Id. at 84 (statement of Councilmember Ray). The law also
prohibits non-aggressive panhandling in specified places. See discussion Infra page 208.
27. See id. at 70 (statement of Councilmember Cropp); Id. at 102 (statement of Councilmember
Nathanson).
28. See id. at 47 (statement of Councilmember Evans).
29. See id.
30. Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility In Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach to
Aggressive Begging, 54 LA L REV. 285 (acknowledging authorship of the Panhandling Control Act of 1993,
D.C. AcT No. 10-98).
31. Letter from Robert Teir to Councilmember Nathanson. October 29. 1992 (-Model Anti-Aggressive
Begging Legislation") (copy on file with DC L. REV). At the legislative session on June 1, 1993,
Councilmember Nathanson incorrectly stated that The Panhandling Control Act of 1993. DC BILL No. 10-
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anti-aggressive panhandling ordinances enacted in Seattle and Atlanta. 2 Several
other cities have adopted or are considering adopting similar legislation. 5
Although the model aggressive panhandling statute appears to be proliferating in
cities plagued by homelessness across the nation, the law has many legal defects,
including several constitutional violations.
A.

First Amendment Free Speech Values

The threshold issue is whether panhandling is protected speech under the First
Amendment to the Constitution. The Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue.
Interestingly, the word "panhandling" does not appear in the text of the District's
Aggressive Panhandling law. The speech, or expressive conduct, prohibited is
described as "ask[ing], beg[ging] or solicit[ing] alms" and is defined as
"includ[ing] the spoken, written or printed word or such other act conducted for
the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or thing of value."80 , In
this article, the shorthand term "begging" is used. The first inquiry is, therefore,
whether "begging" is speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.
1. Begging Serves The Values Underlying The First Amendment And
Therefore Should Be Fully Protected Speech
If speech serves the values that underlie the First Amendment, it should be
72, "was based on the Portland, Oregon ordinance[s]." Panhandling Control Act. 1993: Legislative Session of
the Council of the District of Columbia, June 1, 1993, p. 6 5 (statement of Councilmember Nathanson). A
review of these ordinances, PORTLAND. OR.. MUN. CODE § 14.24.040 (1987) ("Offensive Physical Contact
Prohibited"), and PORTLAND. OR.. MUN. CODE § 14.24.060 (1987) ("Pedestrians"), demonstrates that they
served as a model for the District of Columbia's first two "Panhandling Control Acts", D C BILL No. 8-556
and 9-80, which were introduced by Councilmember and then Chairman Wilson on April 16, 1990, and
January 23, 1991, respectively. A Roundtable Hearing on D.C. BILL No. 9-80, was held on July 24, 1991, by
the Judiciary Committee, at which a considerable amount of comment and testimony was received. As a result
of the many suggestions offered and criticisms made of D.C. BILL No. 9-80, the legislation was completely
redrafted in D.C BILL No. 10-72, based on the AARR model legislation rather than the Oregon ordinances.
No hearings were held on D.C. BILL No. 10-72.
32. Conversation with Robert Teir, January 18, 1994. See SEATTLE. WASH. MUN CODE §§ 12A and
12.015 (1987) and ATLANTA. GA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-3006 (1991).
33. Conversation with Robert Teir, March 23, 1994, who reported that Baltimore, Long Beach, and
Santa Barbara have adopted versions of the legislation, and New York City and Pittsburgh have such
legislation pending. The Baltimore statute was struck down in Patton v. Baltimore City. F. Supp.
(D. Md. 1994).
34. D.C CODE ANN. § 22-3312(a) (Supp. 1994).
35. D.C CODE ANN. § 22-3311(2) (Supp. 1994).
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protected. Several commentators have considered the free speech rights of beggars
in the context of the values underlying the First Amendment and have concluded
that begging falls within them.36 Michael Burns has described in depth five
underlying First Amendment values: enlightenment, democratic governance, self
realization, safety valve, and engagement.
The "enlightenment value" is defined as "the promotion of knowledge, the
formulation of enlightened opinion and the discovery of truth through healthy
competition in 'the market place of ideas.' ",a The enlightenment value holds that
"free expression helps to resolve society's public questions as well as an individual's
private choices."-" Begging is described as "speech that adds to both societal and
individual enlightenment by providing information about poverty and the lives of
poor people." 9 A beggar's plea is "a direct challenge to prevailing assumptions
about the social responsibilities that members of a community owe to each
other."40 It also may serve the purpose of teaching individuals about themselves
and others by sparking "self inquiry" about one's role in society and by providing
information about others by the manner in which one responds to the beggar's
message.41
A second First Amendment value served by beggar's speech, the "democratic
governance value,""' has been described as "improv[ing] society through a more
involved and informed electorate."'" In other words, speech is important because
"the welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues shall
understand them and that all facts and arguments relevant to governance aid such
understanding."" Begging is speech that helps society's decision-makers by
"graphically portraying the plight of the poor in our nation" in the "best and most

36. Burns, supra note 5, at 822 (quoting generally, MELVILLE B NiMtM.ER. Ni?.tt ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 1.02 to 1.04 (1984); Hclen Hcrshkoff &
Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg. 104 HARV L REv. 896
(1991)).
37. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 898.
38. Id. at 898, n. I1. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. 425 U.S.
748, 762-65 (1976) (arguing that the free flow of commercial information helps individual consumers make
educated decisions and also serves a general public interest).
39. Id. at 898.
40. Id. at 899.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 901, n. 26 (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN. POUTICAL FREEDOM- TitE CONTIT TI ONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE, 24 (1965)).
43. Burns, supra note 5, at 822, n. 217 (citing NIMMER supra note 36, at §§ 1-44 to 1-46).
44. MEIKLEJOHN. supra note 42, at 26.
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poignant" way - by poor people themselves addressing other citizens.' It has also
been said that the "beggar's plea" implicitly proposes "a communitarian vision in
which citizens have a responsibility for each other's survival, a perspective that an
informed decisionmaker should consider.""4
The third value or function of free speech is the "development of individual
potential,' '14 or the "self-realization value,"' which recognizes "the premise of
individual dignity and choice"' 9 and "requires that each individual be allowed to
experience the self-respect that comes from free expression." 50 Begging serves this
value because it allows individual beggars to express their opinions on matters vital
to them if "life is to be worth living," 51 including his or her need for basic
sustenance. In addition, the efforts of beggars "to enlist others in their cause is a
'1 2
basic form of self-realization. 5
Related to the self-realization value, the "safety valve"' 3 function of free speech
acknowledges the need for the poor and powerless in society to let off steam about
their needs and goals. Society must permit this kind of speech if it is to avoid more
violent forms of dissent.
The final function or value served by free speech is the "engagement value," 5'
which recognizes the need for free speech if people are to build relationships with
those who are different.55 Begging is described as "much needed speech that
attempts to engage mainstream listeners with the reality of life on the margins of
society," 58' and to do so face-to-face, one-on-one.
It is important to note that commentators5 7 and judges, albeit rarely, have
45.

Burns, supra note 5, at 823-24.

46. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 902, n. 32 (citing Note. The Beggar's Free Speech Claim, 65
IND. L.J. 191, 205-06 (1989)) (concluding that First Amendment protection must be extended to beggar's
speech tovindicate the premise of its commitment to "facilitating the discussion of social issues as a means
toward their solution. .. ).
47. See Burns, supra note 5, at 824.
48. Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 903.
49. Id. at 903 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971)).
50. Id. at 903 (citing Kennith L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U
CHI. L. REV. 20, 26 (1975)).
51. Id. at 903, n. 40 (citing Z. CHAFEE. FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 33 (1948)).

52. Id. at 903-04.
53. Burns, supra note 5, at 825 (quoting NIMMER. supra note 36, at §§ 1-53 to 1-54 (1984)).
54. Id.; see also Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 910.
55. "In a society where the poor have been stigmatized and isolated, where the vast majority of those
more fortunate seek every avenue to avoid reminders of the suffering in our midst, face-to-face contact with
beggars forces connection and relationship on one level." Burns, supra note 5, at 825.
56. Id.
57. See Teir, supra note 30. "Begging does not 'say' anything, and is therefore not within 'the freedom
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opined that begging is not protected speech under the First Amendment. The most
notable of these opinions is Young v. New York City Transit Authority," in which
two members of a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed "grave
doubt as to whether begging and panhandling in the subway are sufficiently
imbued with a communicative character to justify constitutional protection."'eo The
Young holding, however, runs contrary to most opinions, as will be discussed infra.
Since, as the above analysis argues, begging serves the values underlying the
First Amendment and, therefore, is constitutionally protected speech, the next
inquiry must be: What level of First Amendment protection will be afforded this
speech? To determine the level of protection begging will receive, the court must
decide (1) whether begging is charitable or commercial speech; (2) whether
begging is expressive conduct; and (3) what is the forum in which the government
seeks to restrict that speech. Even protected speech may be regulated by time,
place, and manner restrictions under the First Amendment, and each of these
criteria must also be evaluated to ensure that it satisfies constitutional
requirements.
2. Begging Speech Is Much Like Charitable Solicitation
To date, eight cases"0 and a handful of commentators have considered free
speech protections in the context of a variety of laws restricting or prohibiting
begging. As noted, the Supreme Court has not yet squarely ruled on the protection
available to an individual who is begging for his or her own sustenance.
The Supreme Court has ruled in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizensfor a Better
Environment6 that charitable solicitation, or "charitable appeals for funds, on the
street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests - communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the

of speech' protected by the First Amendment." Id.
58. 906 F.2d 146. 153-54 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied. 498 US. 984 (1990).
59. Id. at 153.
60. C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Young v. N.Y City Transit Authority.
denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990); Loper v. N.Y. City Police Dep't. 802 F.
903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affld. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), on appeal. Nos. 92-15447, Nos. 92-15447, 92-15447, 92-15459, 92-15451 (9th Cir. 1992); Ulmer
v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Seattle v.
Webster, 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied; 500 U.S. 908 (1991); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F.
(D. Md. 1994).
F. Supp. Supp. 1441 (W.D. Wash 1994); and Patton v. Baltimore City, 61. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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advocacy of causes - that are within the protection of the First Amendment."0
These interests are directly related to the "enlightenment" 83 and the "democratic"
values," that begging serves, and as such they are also deserving of First
Amendment protection. In coming to this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit, in Blair v.
Shanahan,8" saw "[n]o distinction of constitutional dimension exist[ing] between
soliciting funds for oneself and for charities. . ."since "begging can promote the
very speech values that entitle charitable appeals to constitutional protection."0 0
The Court noted:
. . a request for alms clearly conveys information regarding the speaker's
plight; begging gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and ideas
on, among other things, the way our society treats its poor and
disenfranchised. And in some cases, a beggar's request can change the way
a7
the listener sees his or her relationship with and obligations to the poor.
*

The Supreme Court has also recognized that charitable solicitation is fully
protected speech even when it includes a request for money 8 and even when that
request is made by a professional fundraiser who is paid to solicit the funds.09 In
agreeing that this principle applies also to beggars, the court in Blair v. Shanahan
noted that "the fact that a beggar may keep the money he receives does not strip a

62. Id. at 632; Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781. 803 (1988); Secretary of State
v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984).
63. Begging communicates information about poverty in our midst and an individual's need for money.
The beggar disseminates views and ideas by offering the listener a particular perspective on society and
on the problems of the poor that may be quite different from others to which the listener has access.
Finally, the beggar advocates the general principle that their listeners should take greater responsibility
for others and the particular cause of their own preservation.
Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 905.
64. See supra discussion on pp. 188-89.
65. 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-1323 (N.D. Cal. 1991). See also Loper v. New York City Police Dept.,
802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 999 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the message extended
by solicitors for charity and that extended by the homeless beggar is "the exact same message." and "that
message is entitled to First Amendment protection.
66. Id. at 1322.
67. Id. at 1323 (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796).

68. Id.
69. Id. at 801. "It will not do simply to ignore the First Amendment interest of professional fundraisers
in speaking. It is well settled that a speaker's rights are not lost merely because compensation is received; a
speaker is no less a speaker because he or she is paid to speak." See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 255, 265-66 (1964).
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beggar's protected speech of its claim to First Amendment Protection." 70
In Schaumburg, the court cited two rationales in support of its conclusion that
charitable solicitation is fully protected speech: first, "Solicitation is
characteristically intertwined with information and perhaps persuasive speech
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political,
or social issues;" and second, "without such solicitation, the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease."71 The Blair court agreed with the
first of these rationales, quoting with approval Hershkoff and Cohen's view that,
"like other charitable requests, begging appeals to the listeners' sense of
compassion or social justice, rather than to their economic interest."73 The Blair
court specifically declined to follow Young v. New York City Transit Authority,"'
in which the Second Circuit stated that most people who beg "are not doing so to
convey any social or political message. .

.,"

but "[r]ather, they beg to collect

money." 78 In fact, the Young court, after touting the values served by charitable
solicitors, found that the conduct of begging and panhandling, in contrast, was
"nothing less than a menace to the common good." 7 0 The Blair court found the
Young court's "emphasis on the beggar's motivation

. . .

singularly misplaced in

light of the Supreme Court cases giving professional fundraisers full First
Amendment protection," noting that, in fact, "most professionals who solicit on
behalf of charities" are not doing so to convey any social or political message but,
rather, "to raise money."77 The Blair court also pointed out that "the professional
fundraiser may present a clearer message to his listener than the beggar does ...
[b]ut, First Amendment protection should not be limited to the articulate."73
Three years after the Young decision, in Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 0
another panel of the Second Circuit agreed with the dissent in Young"0 and with
70. Id. at 1323.
71. Schaumburg, 444 US. at 632.
72. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323 (quoting Hershkoff & Cohen. supra note 36. at 908).
73. See also Rose, supra note 46, at 209 (stating that in addition to the conve)ance of a social
cause,"[t]he beggar is the cause) (emphasis in original).
74. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). cert. denied. 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
75. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323.
76. Young, 903 F.2d at 154. (upholding a total ban on panhandling in the N.Y. subway system).
77. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324-24. The court went on to say. "that the pleas of a beggar or professional
fundraiser may change the way their listeners think about their world is often only a desirable side effect." Id.
at 1324.
78. Id.
79. 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
80. Young, 903 F2d at 154 (Meskill, J. dissenting) (citing Loper. 766 F. Supp. at 1283 (holding
beggars deserve the same protection as organized charities)).

192

AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING STATUTE

the majority in Blair, deciding that there is
little difference between those who solicit for organized charities and those
who solicit for themselves in regard to the message conveyed. The former are
communicating the needs of others while the latter are communicating their
personal needs. Both solicit the charity of others. The distinction is not a
significant one for First Amendment purposes. 81
Judge Sweet, in Loper,82 pointed out that cases dealing with charitable
solicitation use the term "solicit," but cases involving the destitute use "pejorative"
terms like "begging and panhandling." Noting that the terms "solicit" and "beg"
are synonymous, i.e., "[tlo beg is to ask for as a charity," Judge Sweet concluded
that the only difference between the terms is that "the act of begging has a
message associated with it, and that message is discomforting." '83
The second rationale underlying the Supreme Court's holding in Schaumburg is
simply that "without such charitable solicitation, the flow of such information and
advocacy would likely cease."" The dependence on funds for continued survival
"applies with even greater urgency to individual beggars." 8 , As Michael Burns has
eloquently said:
[A]mong the hundreds of thousands of beggars in our city streets, few have
any realistic choices, can take advantage of alternative means of survival, or
have any alternative sources of support. Human beings do not beg for fun, or
as part of a get-rich-quick scheme, but rather, because they have no other
way. And the least adept among them die in our doorways.88
The beggar "explicitly appeals for sustenance," and "her advocacy relies on
handouts for survival in an even more visceral sense than does a charitable
' 87
organization.
Like the court in Schaumburg, the court in Blair recognized the immediacy of
individual solutions: "[T]hat the beggar represents himself and not an organized

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Loper, 999 F.2d at 704.
Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1037.
Id.
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
Burns, supra note S. at 830.
Id.
Note, supra note 46, at 208.
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charity should not render his speech unprotected ... .the inherent worth of speech
in4trms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend on the identity of
its source. .. ."" Further, the Blair court and others have observed that it would

be "nonsensical," 89 as well as "ironic,"90 to permit organizations to solicit on
behalf of the poor and the destitute, using some of the funds collected for
administrative costs, and to refuse to permit the beggar to solicit for himself and
"eliminate the middleman." 9 1 .
3.

Begging Is Not Commercial Speech

The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience"' a and has held that
speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" is entitled to
reduced First Amendment protection. 3
The Supreme Court in Schaumburg held that charitable solicitation is not
commercial speech because it "does more than inform private economic decisions
and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs of goods and services."" Implicit in the language used by
the court is the notion that charitable solicitation also "informs private economic
decisions" and provides other economic information. Begging also is more than just
a commercial transaction. While a beggar's speech is "expression related to...
[his or her] economic interests," as noted above,0 5 it frequently is not solely so. A
beggar's speech is also not related solely to the listener's economic interests but,

88. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 435 U.S. 765. 777
(1978)).
89. Id. at 209.
90. Burns, supra note 5, at 831.
Yet the irony of permitting secondary, sanitized begging and not primary begging is obvious. It reflects
charity in its most patronizing form. Not only do we prefer to give to, but we also afford more rights to.
organizations operated by those of our own social class who will funnel our contributions (after deducting
overhead costs) for use in a prescribed manners.
Id.
91. Note, supra note 46, at 209.
92. See Central Hudson Gas and Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557. 561 (1980); Virginia
Pharmacy Board v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. 425 US. 748, 762 (1976).
93. Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n., 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
94. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
95. See supra discussion on pp. 187-90.
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rather, may well appeal to his or her "sense of compassion or social justice." For
the same reasons, a beggar's speech clearly does more than "propose a commercial
transaction." In both charitable solicitation and begging, combining economic
appeals with social and political information lifts the speech out of the category of
commercial speech and entitles both the charitable solicitor and the beggar to full
First Amendment protection."
4. Begging Is Fully Protected Expressive Conduct
Beggar's speech may also be considered expressive conduct protected under the
First Amendment, using the tests outlined in Spence v. Washington" and
reaffirmed in Texas v. Johnson.99 In order to determine that conduct is protected,
the court must ask (1) whether an attempt to convey a particularized message is
present and (2) whether the likelihood is great that the message will be understood
by those who view it. 100 In Spence, the Supreme Court held that the display of an
upside down flag with a peace sign taped to it met both prongs of this test because
the conduct in question was not "an act of mindless nihilism" but, rather, "a
pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then current domestic and
foreign affairs of his government, and that at that time, the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."101 The Court
afforded full First Amendment protection to this expressive conduct.
Even if the Court concluded that begging is not pure speech, it should be
protected as expressive conduct under both prongs of the Spence test. In Loper v.
New York City Police Department,0 2 the Second Circuit viewed begging as the
equivalent of charitable solicitation for First Amendment protection purposes, but
also considered beggar's speech as expressive conduct, noting that begging
constitutes the communication of "a particularized social or political message"108
and that such messages about the need for support and assistance are conveyed to
the public even without speech, by the "presence of an unkempt and disheveled
96. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323 (quoting Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 908).
97. See supra discussion on pp. 194-95.
98. 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974).
99. 491 U.S. 397, 403-06 (1988) (holding that the burning of the American flag was fully protected
expressive conduct under the First Amendment).
100. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
101. Id.
102. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
103. Id. at 704. "Begging frequently is accompanied by speech indicating the need for shelter, clothing,
medical care or transportation." Id.
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person holding out their hand or a cup to receive a donation."' 0 ' In other words,
"the attempt to convey a particularized message is present in begging, and the
likelihood is great that the message will be understood by those who view it.' '1C5 By
contrast, Robert Teir' 0 6 has suggested that "[i]t is incredible to assert that those
who beg do so in order to express some political or economic idea," and he has
described the beggar as "stand[ing] in the same position as the holdup man with a
gun." 0 7
Using similar reasoning, the Young court stated:
The only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of begging is
that beggars want to extract money from those whom they accost. While we
acknowledge that passengers generally understand this generic message, we
think it falls far outside the scope of protected speech under the First
Amendment. 08
However, the Young court is in the clear minority in excluding begging from
protected speech. Even Teir has admitted that "only the Young court has voiced
this opinion," and even it, in Teir's words, "cautiously offered an alternative
justification for its holding."' 0 9 Teir also acknowledged that "the scope of Young
did not prove to be very broad"" 0 in light of the Loper case, also by the Second
Circuit, which struck down as unconstitutional a statute prohibiting "loitering for
the purpose of begging.""' Teir characterized the Loper decision as "entirely
inconsistent with the conclusion that panhandling is not speech and is therefore not
entitled to constitutional protection.""12 In concluding that begging is clearly
expressive conduct deserving of First Amendment protection,"' commentators
Hershkoff and Cohen explained:
104. Id.
105. But see Young, 903 F.2d at 153, ..
begging is not inseparably intertwined with a
particularized message"); Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland. 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1976).
"'Begging and soliciting for alms do not necessarily involve the communication of information or opinion." Id.
at 446. This case preceded the Supreme Court decision in Schaumburg, hoevcr. and thus, at least with
respect to charitable solicitation, is no longer good law.
106. Teir, supra note 30, at 38.
107. Id.
108. Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
109. Teir, supra note 30. at 40.
110. Id. at 30.
Ill. Loper, 999 F.2d at 699.
112. Id.
113. Expressive conduct has also been described as symbolic speech. See. e.g.. Johnson. 491 U.S. at 405.
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Beggar[s] take no particular action. They may walk toward the person they
entreat, or hold out a cup, or stand behind a hat, but they need not do any of
these things in order to beg. When the government prohibits begging, '[t]he
11 4
only 'conduct' which. . . [it seeks] to punish is the fact of communication.'
Once it is determined that "begging is fully protected speech or expressive
conduct under the First Amendment, the remaining issues concern the nature and
purposes of the government regulations and the type of forum involved.
B. Content-Neutraland Content-Based Regulations Under The First
Amendment
If, as the foregoing analysis argues, begging is fully protected speech or
expressive conduct under the First Amendment, then government regulations
pertaining to begging or panhandling must be analyzed to determine whether those
regulations are content-neutral or content-based. If the government's interest is not
related to the suppression of free expression, it is content-neutral."' If the courts
view the begging as expressive conduct, they will apply the lower standard
announced in U.S. v. O'Brien"' in evaluating if the regulation passes constitutional
muster. This test requires the court to decide (1) if the regulation is within the
constitutional power of the government; (2) if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; and (3) if the incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
17
interest.'
If begging is viewed as speech, the courts will apply the standard applicable to
time, place, and manner restrictions described in Ward v. Rock against Racism." 8
This test requires the court to decide (1) if the regulation is justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, (2) if it is narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) if it leaves open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information."' The practical impact
of whether the court views begging as speech or as expressive conduct is

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Hershkoff & Cohen, supra note 36, at 908 (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18).
Id.
391 U.S. 367, (1968).
Id. at 377.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 791.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

insignificant since there is "little if any differen[ce]" between the two tests. 20
On the other hand, if the government's interest in regulating the expressive
conduct is content-based and a regulation is being applied because of disagreement
with the message presented,1 21 then the court's scrutiny must be more demanding.
Applying the test enunciated in Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators
Ass'n.,11 the court will require the government to demonstrate that the regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.123 The application of these tests to D.C.'s aggressive panhandling
law is discussed in section III.
C.

The Public Forum Doctrine

After analyzing the content of statutory restrictions on panhandling, the court
must finally inquire into the forum involved. The courts follow the "now familiar
forum-based approach in assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place
on the use of its property." 1 24 The Supreme Court has identified three fora that
determine the standard of judicial review of First Amendment claims: public
forum, designated public forum (also known as "nontraditional or limited public
forum"), 2 5 and non-public forum.1 26 The strictest level of scrutiny is applied to
government restrictions on speech in a public forum.l2
Two formulas are used to determine that a particular place is a public forum.
The first is whether the speech occurs on government property that has

120. Texas v. Johnson. 491 US. 403. See infra discussion on page 212.
121. Id.
122. 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
123. Id.
124. Loper v. NYPD, 999 F.2d 699, 703. (1993). citing International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992). For critical views of the forum-based approach. see.
e.g.. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner. 893 F.2d. 1387. 1396-1400. (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(J.Williams concurring), and Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forurn Problems In First
Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO WASH L REV. 109, 110 (1986). "In the past, the public forum concept has
been an important tool in securing access to public property for speech activity. The conversion of this concept
into a device for denying open and equal access provides a case study in how legal concepts and doctrines can
be manipulated and distorted to serve differing objectives."
125. Note, Ward v. Rock Against Racism. Reasonable Regulations and State Sponsored Sound. 10
PACE L REV. 633, 636 (1990).
126. Perry Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37. 45-46.
127. Id. at 45. ". .. [the] rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed" See
also, e.g., U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 US. 720, 726 (1990). "Public forum analysis requires strict scrutiny.-
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"traditionally been available for public expression." 12 5 Streets, parks,12 9 public
sidewalks, 3 " and other public places of the city 31 are classic public fora because
they have
.. .immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens .... 2
An important reason for affording the highest level of constitutional protection
to speech in public fora is that such places are "often a speaker's last resort,"
providing an inexpensive channel for communication of "the poorly financed
causes of little people" who would otherwise be drowned out by "those with access
to more elaborate (and more costly) channels of communication." 18
The second test for determining whether a given area is a public forum is
whether the government property in question "has as a principal purpose the free
exchange of ideas," 1 4 as evidenced by "a long standing historical practice of
government permitted speech." 13 15 Not surprisingly, this test, first announced in
1985 in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,, 00 has not
been used to identify any additional public fora.
The designated public forum category is defined as "government property that

128. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1990), citing,
e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1982).
129. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496. 515 (1939).
130. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988). See also U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983)
(sidewalks comprising the outer boundary of the Supreme Court are indistinguishable from other sidewalks in
Washington, D.C. and constitute a proper public forum).
131. Hague, 307 U.S. at 517, and Notes and comments, Michael A. Scherago, Closing the Door on the
Public Forum, 26 Loy L.A. L. REv. 241, at n.4.
132. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515; see also International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2701. 2706 (1992), citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
800 (1985).
133. See Note, supra note 46, at 204.
134. International Societyfor Krishna Consciousness. 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706 (1992). citing Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
135. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S.Ct. at 2711-12 (opinion by O'Connor, J.)
and at 2716 (concurring opinion by Kennedy, J.).
136. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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the state has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public."'" Such
areas may include state fair-grounds,lss municipal theaters, and university meeting
facilities.130 Strict scrutiny standards also apply to regulations that seek to restrict
140
expressive activities in designated public fora.
Under both public forum and designated public forum categories, the initial
issue is whether the speech restriction 41 in question is content-based. 1 43 For
example, if a regulation restricts the speech of one group (e.g., beggars) but not
the speech of others, the regulation is content-based and fails unless it is
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest" and "narrowly drawn to achieve
that end."' ' Conversely, if the regulation is content-neutral, a lower standard of
review applies. In either case, the government may also regulate the time, place,
and manner of expression in public fora, so long as any limitations imposed are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 14 4 This standard has
137. Id. at 2705, citing Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 45.
138. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640. 655 (1981)
(holding state fairgrounds limited public forum).
139. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding university meeting facilities limited public
forum).
140. The future of the Cornelius test is in some doubt. It was sharply criticized by Justice Kennedy,
joined by three other justices in his concurring opinion in InternationalSociety for Krishna Conscousress, in
which he described the notion that traditional public fora had "public discourse as their principal purpo=e" as
"a most doubtful fiction" Id. at 2717. The Justice suggested that in fact, the principal purpose of the classic
public fora, streets and sidewalks, was "to facilitate transportation, and of public parks, for "beauty and open
space" Id. Justice Kennedy counseled that the public forum doctrine was meant "to give effect to the broad
command of the First Amendment to protect speech from governmental interference" Id. He further observed
that the new test "leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property by
doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech related purpose for the area," and he added that "it leaves
almost no scope for the development of new public forum absent the rare approval of the government" Id. at
2716. The Justice proposed that the appropriate inquiry is an objective one: "if the physical characteristics of
the property at issue, and the actual public access and uses which have been permitted by the government
indicated that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is a public
forum" Id. at 2716-17. The case was decided by a five to four vote with Justice White in the majority. Now
that Justice Ginsberg has replaced Justice White on the court, the Kennedy view may well prevail in later
cases.
141. This article views begging as fully protected speech and expressive conduct. Unprotected forms of
speech including obscenity, fighting words, defamation, false or misleading speech, and the like., may be
regulated expressly because of the content. See Scherago, supra note 131, at 242, n.9, for an extensive
compilation of unprotected and minimally protected forms of speech; and "The Beggars Free Speech Claim,"
Id. at 211-212, n.109 and accompanying text (citations omitted).
142. Perry Education Ass'n., 460 U.S at 45.
143. Id.
144. Ward, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 468
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been termed "mid-level scrutiny.' 145
Some public property is considered neither public fora nor designated public
fora, but rather non-public fora. These include military bases,'140 some airports, 47
and the sidewalk between a post office and its parking lot-_ 48places that have not
by history, tradition, or designation been a forum for public communication.1 49 In
such areas, the government is viewed more as a private owner and therefore has
"the power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated."150 Restrictions on speech in those places are not subjected to
strict scrutiny, but to the much lower standard of reasonableness.101
At least two paradigms have been advanced to guide judicial review in all public
forum cases. The first is the "Enhancement" model, which stands for the
proposition that the court's primary responsibility in public forum cases is to
"maximize the opportunities of citizens to engage in expressive activity."'0 31
Second, and equally important, is the "Distortion" model, which views the goal of
the court as crafting "a doctrinal structure that will reduce the systemic
opportunities for public forum regulators to abuse their governmental power."'08
These models are seen as complementary by courts interested in expanding
opportunities for free speech activities in public fora and as competing or even
contradictory by courts attempting to further regulate public use of public fora.

H.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DiSTRiCI's NEW

AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING LAW

Fortunately, the District did not adopt a total ban on begging, since as a general
matter, it is clear that an absolute ban on begging will not be upheld because it is
inherently content-based, singling out begging speech from all other kinds of

U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
145. See Perry Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; and Scherago, supra note 131, at 3.
146. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases non-public forum).
147. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2706 (airports non-public forum).
148. U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (sidewalk outside post office not a public forum).
149. Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 46.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2706. In a non-public forum, in addition to being reasonable, restrictions on speech may not
be "discriminatory against a particular view point." Perry Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
152. Brevier. RehabilitatingPublic Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 80 Sup. CT REV 81
(1992).
153. Id.
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speech.' Applying the strict scrutiny test, several courts have held that regardless
of how compelling the government interests are, an absolute ban on begging would
fail because it would not be narrowly drawn to achieve those interests. 10 However,
several discreet sections of D.C.'s aggressive panhandling laws which are
unconstitutional or otherwise legally defective will be challenged in the planned
lawsuit seeking declaratory relief described supra.?5
First, the District's statute impermissibly restricts begging in public and private
fora. Section 3 of the District's panhandling law overbroadly restricts some or all
begging in "any place open to the general public, including sidewalks, streets,
alleys, driveways, parking lots, parks, plazas, buildings, doorways and entrances to
buildings, and gasoline service stations and the grounds enclosing buildings...117
public transportation vehicle[s], or at any bus, train, or subway station or
stop. .. 58 within ten (10) feet of any automatic teller machine (ATM) . . .15 in
traffic on a public street 60 [and] on private property or residential property."' 0'
Streets, parks, and sidewalks are all traditional public fora. 0 2 In addition, in
CCNV v. Turner, the D.C. Circuit Court held that in the District of Columbia the
above ground areas at metro stops are public fora, in part because these areas are
often "indistinguishable from the public sidewalks."' 03 The court also held that the
above ground areas of metro qualify as designated public fora because, by
promulgating regulations regarding the area, the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority (WMATA) (as the government) has "indicated an intent to
open these areas to a wide range of free speech activities."04
Several other areas listed in the District's statute appear to meet the
requirements for public or designated public forum status, although they have not
been adjudicated as such. "Plaza," for example, is defined in the dictionary as "the
154. See Note, supra note 46, at 21" (regulation of begging speech inherently conicnt-based).
155. See, e.g.. Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 706 (statute prohibiting begging throughout New York City
unconstitutional violation of First Amendment, because not narrowly tailored to serve government interests;,
Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324 (California begging statute prohibiting begging in public places violated First
Amendment); C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d. 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Florida begging statute prohibiting
begging in public places violated First Amendment).
156. See supra discussion on page 182.
157. D.C CODE ANN. § 22-3312(a) (Supp. 1994).
158. Id. § (b).
159. Id. § (c).
160. Id. § (d).
161. Id. § (h).
162. See text on page 197-198. nn. 129-30.
163. 893 F.2d at 1391.
164. Id.
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public square or open space in a city or town."16 5 Parking lots owned by the
District or District agencies are often open to the public for public activities in
which expressive activity is permitted. Most ATM machines are surrounded by
public sidewalks or plazas. The "grounds enclosing public buildings" are also
typically sidewalks. Public buildings often contain areas that are designated for or
have traditionally been available for public expression, such as auditoriums and
meeting rooms. Doorways and entrances to public buildings, such as the District
Building, have traditionally served as effective areas for demonstrations, picketing,
and other protected expressive activities. Public driveways and alleys are similar to
streets, which are included in the definition of public fora.
Some government buildings and their doorways and entrances, governmentowned parking lots, and government-owned residential housing may be considered
to be non-public fora and, therefore, subjected to a lesser standard of scrutiny.
Gasoline service stations, non-government buildings and their doorways and
entrances, private parking lots, and residential property are privately owned and
thus also are not public fora. The majority of places in which begging is restricted
by the Aggressive Panhandling Statute, however, clearly fall within the definition
of "public fora." As such, a strict scrutiny analysis of any restrictions on speech 0 0
on these premises is required. In these areas the District's ban on begging must be
evaluated both as a content-based restriction on speech, and as a time, place, or
manner restriction on speech. With regard to government-owned non-public fora, a
low-level scrutiny analysis is required. Privately owned property is not subject to
this analysis. 167
A. The Statute Contains Content-Based Restrictions on Speech In Public
Fora
In assessing the D.C. government's efforts to restrict begging speech in public or
designated public fora, the first step is to determine whether the restriction in

165. Random House Dictionary of the English Language, (2d ed. 1987).
166. See text on pp. 197-200, nn. 126, 144.
167. The statute permits the government to regulate the conduct of beggars, but not others, on private
property. As such, the law is unconstitutional, because in effect it requires beggars to seek affirmative
permission to beg while allowing others to use private property for solicitation for political causes or for
hopscotch without securing permission. It is likely that police will assume that no permission has been secured
and will use the statute to shoo beggars exercising their First Amendment rights off private property while
leaving other users alone.
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question is content-based or content-neutral.10 8 The District's new statute is clearly
content-based."' Section 22-3311(2) of the act defines "[a]sk, beg, or solicit alms"
to include "the spoken, written, or printed word or such other act conducted for
70
the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or thing of value.'
Section 22-3313 of the act, by contrast, expressly permits" [a]cts authorized as an
exercise of a person's constitutional right to picket, protest, or speak, and acts
authorized by a permit issued by the District of Columbia government."'' Thus,
the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection in that "it
discriminates between 'lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of...
communication.' "172 As in Blair and Loper, this law is content-based because
sections 22-3311 and 22-3313 "treat. . . solicitors standing side-by-side
differently. If the solicitor is an organized charity, the solicitation is permitted. If
the solicitor is a beggar, seeking alms, the solicitation is criminal."'"' By singling
out those persons who must ask for the help of others, sometimes in order to
survive, the D.C. law looks at the whole spectrum of words spoken in public and
74
impermissibly prohibits "expression of views on one particular subject."'
Commentator Robert Teir recently recognized that a ban on aggressive begging
could be considered content-based 175 because it does not prohibit "intimidating or
coercive speech unrelated to soliciting alms."' 70 In spite of his support of
restrictions on begging, even Teir recognizes that if deemed to be content-based
restrictions on protected speech, then aggressive begging prohibitions are likely to
be struck down. As he said, "[a]lthough the motivating causes for these measures
are exceedingly important, they probably cannot justify the squelching of a
particular message or viewpoint presented [in a public forum]." 1'" The Supreme
Court has struck down content-based restrictions on both speech and expressive

168. See discussion beginning on page 196.
169. See Note, supra note 46, at 217 (describing regulation of begging speech as inherently content
based).
170. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3311(2) (Supp. 1994).
171. Id. at 3313, § 4.
172. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325, quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980) (law permitting
picketing on labor issues but not on non-labor issues violates Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection).
173. Loper, 802 F. Supp. at 1040.
174. Carey, 447 U.S. at 461
175. Id.
176. Teir, supra note 30, at 47. Aggressive begging is prohibited by DC CODE ANN § 22-3312 (Supp.
1994).
177. Id. at 48.
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conduct under First Amendment analysis. 178 In the context of protected speech in
a public forum, content-neutrality is determined by "whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys.' 79 In Clark v. CCNV,' 80 the Supreme Court found a statute that
prohibited camping in some but not all parks to be content-neutral because the
government's purpose in enforcing the regulation was substantial-to conserve
park property-and unrelated to the suppression of expression. Demonstrators and
non-demonstrators alike were prohibited from camping in the park. In this
situation, the "incidental effect on some speakers and messages"19 1
notwithstanding, the statute was constitutionally valid.
In Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles et al. v. Taxpayers
for Vincent et al.,8 2 the Supreme Court upheld a statute that prohibited the
"posting of signs on public property,' 1 83s because the text of the ordinance was
silent concerning any speaker's point of view and had been applied to all in an
evenhanded manner.l84
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,185 the court upheld as content-neutral a
regulation requiring bandshell performers to use sound-amplification equipment
and a sound technician provided by the city 8 because the justification for the
provision-to control noise levels and to avoid undue intrusion into residential and
other areas of the park-18had nothing to do with content. 88
By contrast, Boos v. Barry189 concerned the District of Columbia's enforcement
of a statute that prohibited the "display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy that tends to bring the foreign government into 'public odium' or 'public
disputes.' "190 The Supreme Court found that this law was content-based because
178. "The First Amendment is concerned not only with the extent to which a law reduces the total
quantity of communication, but also - and perhaps even more fundamentally - with at least three additional
factors: distortion of public debate, improper [government] motivation and [the] communicative impact [on
the audience]." Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 CHi. L REV. 46, 54 (1987).
179. Ward, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting Clark, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
183. Id.at 791.
184. Id.at 804.
185. Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
186. Id.at 784.
187. Id. at 792.
188. Id., quoting Boos v. Barry, at 320.
189. Boos, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
190. Id.at 315.
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one category of speech, "that critical of a foreign government, [was] completely
prohibited within 500 feet of embassies," whereas "[o]ther categories of speech,
such as favorable speech about a foreign government or speech concerning a labor
dispute with a foreign government [were] permitted."101 The Court in Boos also
concluded that the statute was content-based because its "justification focus[ed]
only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its
listeners," 19 2 while content-neutral statutes are "justified without reference to the
1 93
content of the regulated speech."
The Supreme Court followed the Boos reasoning in Texas v. Johnson, which
dealt with expressive conduct instead of speech.'04 In that case, the statute in
question prohibited the "desecration of a venerated object." Johnson was convicted
of burning a United States flag during a political protest against Reagan
administration policies. The Court found that the regulation was content-based
because the government's justification for the regulation-to prevent breaches of
the peace by audiences who might take offense-"depended on the likely
communicative impact [on listeners] of [the] expressive conduct"' 1 15 and, thus, the
expression was restricted "because of the content of the message conveyed."' 0 0
As described in Part I of this article, 9 the District's statute was passed by
Councilmembers who focused solely on the direct impact that begging speech and
expressive conduct has on listeners and observers. The law was needed to protect
listeners from being hassled, annoyed, and interfered with, and from fraud, fear,
and intimidation. The Councilmembers were also particularly concerned that the
effect of the begging speech on tourists and business patrons was causing them to
stay away from District businesses.109 However, as in Boos, the District's antibegging statute forbids one category of speech, related to begging for alms, and
permits other categories of speech such as soliciting for charities, soliciting for
political action or funding, and picketing. 1 9 The statute here also "regulates
speech due to its primary impact [on listeners]," and thus it must be considered

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.at 319.
Id.
Id.at 318.
Ward, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id at 412.
Id.at 413.
See supra discussion on pp. 184-85.
Id.
But see text on pages 222-24.
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I. Section 22-3312(a) of the Statute Is Not Narrowly Drawn
When, as here, a law is a content-based restriction on protected activity, it
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny unless the District of Columbia government
can demonstrate that "it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the
[government] is entitled to protect" 201 and is "a narrowly drawn regulation
designed to serve the interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms.1 202 Further, as has been noted by courts and by

commentators, "The test of strict scrutiny has always been considered a rigorous
and highly speech-protective test, and, when it has been applied, there are few
8 03
examples of laws abridging expression that have survived it."

In Blair v. Shanahan,2°0 the court struck down a content-based ban on begging
"in any place open to the public," which the government had sought to justify "to
avoid annoyance to the public" and to "protect the public from intrusive conduct
which is threatening and coercive to those who are accosted .... ,,205 The Blair
court held that, even assuming the government interest was compelling, the statute
was "neither necessary nor narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."200 The court
emphasized requirements both of necessity and specificity. Regarding necessity,
the court pointed out that "[a]ny of the acts of coercing, threatening, or
200. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
201. Courts have identified a wide variety of interests protected by the government which have been
characterized inter alia as compelling, legitimate, substantial, significant, and important. Some of these
include preventing crime, fraud and duress; protecting privacy, public health, safety, welfare and convenience;
and promoting roadway safety, and traffic efficiency. For a good discussion of the range of government
interests in this context, see, Mabury, Brother can you spare some change? - and Your Privacy Too?:
Avoiding a Fatal Collision Between Public Interests and Beggars' First Amendment Rights, 28 US.F L
Rav. 309, 325-326 (Winter 1994), and accompanying citations. The author of this article is a former
Assistant General Counsel of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), who argues
that "In accordance with organized solicitation principles, restrictions on begging in public places,
traditionally reserved or designated for public expression, should be closely examined, thus ensuring that they
serve compelling government interests in a manner that is both unrelated to the content of the expression, and
even handedly applied to all who desired to solicit funds." Id. at 326. (citations omitted.)
202. Munson, 467 U.S. at 960-61, quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636-37.
203. Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, GOLDEN GATE U L REv I, 23 (Spring 1993).
. it is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny," Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.
Ct. 1846, 1857 (1992).
204. Blair, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1324.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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intimidating, if clearly defined, may be constitutionally prohibited by the state via
a statute that does not limit the freedom of speech of some citizens;" and since the
government currently had "a plethora of content-neutral statutes" with which to
protect the population from threatening conduct, the statute was not necessary.?
As to specificity, the court held that the statute was not narrowly drawn because it
did not "define the proscribed acts with relation to the threats or intimidation to be
avoided" but rather, with "relation to protected speech." 2 3 The court said, "It is
speech that the state bars with this statute, not threatening or intimidating
encounters in public space." 20
In Loper,210 the court struck down another content-based total ban on begging
in a public forum. The court decided that the statute failed all three levels of
scrutiny: the strict scrutiny required for a content-based statute, the mid-level
scrutiny applied to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, and the
lowest level of scrutiny applied to expressive conduct. 2 As in Blair, the court
found that the government's interests "in preventing the fraud, intimidation,
coercion, harassment and assaultive conduct that is said frequently to accompany
begging by individual street solicitors who do not solicit on behalf of any
organization" 21 2 were satisfied by "a number of statutes that address this sort of
conduct specifically,"213 and that a begging ban provides a greater restriction than
is needed to further these government interests because "it sweeps within its
overbroad purview the expressive conduct and speech that the government should
have no interest in stifling." 21 '
In Boos v. Barry, cited supra, after the Supreme Court determined that the
statute was content-based, 21 it then found that it was invalid because it was not
sufficiently narrowly drawn since a readily available existing statute proved to be
"a less restrictive alternative." 216 The less restrictive statute prohibited "willful
acts or attempts to 'intimidate, coerce, threaten or harass a foreign

207. Id. The court, in note 10, listed examples as assault, battery, challenging to a fight, disturbing
another by loud noise, use of offensive words and, willful and malicious obstruction of thoroughfares and
public places (citation omitted).
208. Id. at 1325.
209. Id.
210. Loper, 999 F 2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
211. Id. at 704-706.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 705-706.
215. See supra discussion beginning on page 204.
216. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
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....
, ",217 Under the alternative statute, such conduct was not tied to
protected free speech activities, and the statute served the compelling government
interest of protecting foreign officials without impinging on First Amendment
freedoms.
The District's panhandling law is similarly unnecessary and not narrowly drawn.
With regard to the provision prohibiting aggressive panhandling, even if the
governmental interests in preventing the kinds of conduct included in the definition
of "aggressive manner" are compelling, the D.C. government currently has a
number of content-neutral statutes that protect the population from aggressive
behavior, including laws against assault and threatened assault, battery, disorderly
210
If
conduct, unlawful assembly, threats to do bodily harm, and incommoding.
any undesirable conduct is not already explicitly prohibited, a new statute could be
adopted for that purpose without reference to protected speech activities.
Similarly, in the context of the passive begging provisions of the statute, even
assuming that the government's interests in protecting the public from passive
begging are compelling, existing statutes and WMATA regulations already serve
the desired purposes without impinging on protected speech activities. Interference
with transit riders, 2 9 disorderly conduct, incommoding, and other laws are in place
and may be enforced to protect the public. Again, any unwanted conduct not
expressly forbidden already should be the subject of a new law that does not
reference speech activities.
Three examples of unnecessarily overbroad provisions of D.C.'s statute will
illustrate this point. First, subsection (c) 22- 0 of the statute prohibits begging within
ten feet of ATM machines. In fact, individuals who passively seek alms are not
any real concern to ATM users. The government should adopt a statute
prohibiting acting in an aggressive manner toward ATM users, including
intimidation and related behavior. Such a statute would serve the government's
interests in protecting ATM users with a content-neutral, narrowly tailored law
that would not unnecessarily restrict protected speech.
Second, subsection (d) 22 1 prohibits begging from drivers or occupants of cars in
traffic. The government's interest is to prevent interference with traffic for public

official.

217. Id. at 325; quoting 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2).
218. See infra at 218-224 for discussion and cites to statutes listed. Unlawful assembly is prohibited by
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1107 (1989), and Threats to do Bodily Harm by D.C CODE ANN. § 22-507 (1989).
219. § 100.5. Regulation Concerning the Use by Others of WMATA Property, approved Jan. 15. 1987,
(hereinafter cited as WMATA Regulations).
220. D.C CODE ANN § 22-3312(c) (Supp. 1994).
221. Id. § (d).
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safety reasons. These interests, however, should not be related specifically to the
content of the message of the interferer, which might involve begging, politics, or
prophecies about the end of the world. Again, a content-neutral statute prohibiting
interference with traffic serves the government's interests without singling out the
speech of beggars for criminalization.
Third, subsections (e), (f), and (g) 22 prohibit passive begging in the context of
saving public parking places, cleaning windows of cars in traffic, and "protecting,
watching, washing, cleaning, repairing, or painting" parked cars or bicycles,
respectively. Here again, it is not the seeking of alms that causes the mischief the
government seeks to eliminate but the wrongful exacting of fees in return for
saving public parking places, the interference with traffic while seeking fees for
services, the unwanted interference with parked cars, and the related intimidation
of those who park on public streets. A content-neutral statute, which would
address the unwanted conduct without reference to passive begging, would pass
constitutional muster without unnecessarily restricting protected free speech
activities.
B. The Statute Contains Content-Based Restrictions on Speech in Non-Public
Fora
In addition to public and designated public fora, non-public fora are subject to
D.C.'s statute. The Supreme Court has held that a regulation on speech in a nonpublic forum must only be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 223 Bans on solicitation
have been considered in two non-public forum cases.
In U.S. v. Kokinda,2 4 the Supreme Court upheld a ban on all solicitation on
Postal Service premises without reference to time, place, or manner restrictions,
applying the low-level scrutiny test of reasonableness required for non-public fora
cases. The Court determined that the ban was based on the government's interest
''
Noting
in achieving "the most efficient and effective postal delivery system."2
that solicitation is "inherently more disruptive than other [permitted] speech
activities," 226 the Court held that the ban was justified on that basis as content-

222. Id. §§ (e). (f). and (g).
223. Perry Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
224. Kokinda. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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neutral, since it was not being enforced because of disagreement with the views of
any disfavored groups. The Court found that the ban was reasonable because, by
excluding all groups from engaging in solicitation, the Postal Service was not
granting to "one side of a debatable public question. . .a monopoly in expressing
its views.1 227

In International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 22 8 the Supreme
Court also applied the low-level scrutiny test required for speech restrictions in
non-public fora. The majority found that an airport's ban on solicitation of all
kinds by all individuals passed the reasonableness test and was justified by the
government's legitimate interest in crowd control. 229
By contrast, the District's statute is a content-based restriction that applies only
to those who passively or aggressively seek alms. It does not apply to those who
solicit funds for political candidates, or for marching band uniforms for the local
junior high school, or for cystic fibrosis research. 28 0 As such, under the strict
scrutiny analysis described supra, which is required in assessing content-based
statutes, the statute must fail because it is content-based and not narrowly drawn
to satisfy compelling government interests.
C. The Statute Contains Unconstitutional Time, Place, and Manner
Restrictions
Section (a) 231 of the District's statute bans begging in an "aggressive manner"
in a variety of places and thus includes "manner" and "place" restrictions on
speech. Similarly, sections (b) through (h) 2' 2 of the statute prohibit passive
begging in a variety of places and manners, so they also are "place" and "manner"
restrictions on speech. In Perry Educ. Ass'n., the Supreme Court "first articulated
the version of the [time, place, and manner] standard [in a public forum] that has
taken firm root: 'The state may enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner
of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant

227. Id.
228. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
229. Id.
230. To the extent that the statute may be read to prohibit conduct done with "the intention of
obtaining an immediate donation" and thus includes within its scope political, charitable and other solicitation,
such reading goes beyond the intent of the legislators who approved the law See Infra discussion beginning on
page 222, for discussion of the overbreadth doctrine as it applies to the statute.
231. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-3312(a) (Supp. 1994).
232. Id. §§ (b) - (h).
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government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication."' 2 33
The Supreme Court has not addressed time, place, or manner restrictions on
begging speech in public fora. It has discussed such restrictions on the related
activity of solicitation in just one case, involving a designated public forum at a
state fairgrounds. In Heffron v. Int7 Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,1 4 the Court
upheld as a valid place restriction a rule requiring that all solicitation, sale, or
distribution activities be conducted at fixed locations on the fairgrounds. The
Court found that this rule was content-neutral

because

it was applied

evenhandedly to all persons or organizations, whether commercial or charitable,
who wished to sell or distribute written material or to solicit funds, and it served
the "significant government interest" of "managing the flow of the crowd."23
By contrast, the Second Circuit in Loper3 0 held that a statute prohibiting
loitering in a public place for purposes of begging was not content-neutral because
it prohibited all speech related to begging. The court also said that the "statute
cannot be characterized as a merely incidental limitation, because it serve[s] to
silence both speech and expressive conduct on the basis of the message." 3 7
The District's panhandling statute is not content-neutral because it is not
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, and, it is not
applied even-handedly."23 8 The content of the statute expressly requires the
suppression of one kind of speech: begging. The statute is not "evenhanded" since
it applies only to beggars rather than to all aggressive or passive speakers
regardless of their point of view or topic.230 Thus, the statute regulates aggressive
and passive begging in some fora, but not aggressive or passive speech involving
religion, politics, charitable solicitation, or any other topic. One is permitted to
pursue a passerby aggressively or otherwise in hopes of gaining her signature on a
petition of a political candidate or a donation for such candidate, to picket
aggressively, or for any other purpose not related to seeking alms for one's
personal needs. Each of these activities may be disruptive, annoying, or
intimidating but they are still permitted.
The government's position will likely be that the statute's purpose, which is "the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Rohr, supra note 203, at 27; citing Perry Education Ass'n, 460 US. at 45.
452 U.S. 640 (1981).
Id. at 650.
Loper, 999 F 2d 699 (2d Cir 1993)
Id.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791
But see infra at 224-226.
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controlling consideration, ' 210 is to prevent citizens from being hassled, annoyed,
and interfered with, and to protect citizens from fraud, fear, and intimidation.
These purposes, 241 the government will argue, are unrelated to the suppression of
speech.2 42 In the unlikely event that a court did find that the purposes of the
District's statute were unrelated to the content of expression, and thus contentneutral, the statute could stand "even if [the regulation] has an incidental effect on
some speakers or messages, but not others. 243
The case of Young v. NYCTA 244 illustrates this position. The court held that a
ban on begging in the subway system was content-neutral because "even if begging
had no communicative character at all [the significant dangers posed by begging]
would be just as real" and, consequently, there would remain a substantial
governmental interest in prohibiting the conduct in the subway. * OThe regulation
was upheld because it was "justified on the ground that it serves legitimate
governmental interests totally unrelated to the suppression of free expression.1 218
1. Even If the Statutes' Restrictions Are Content- Neutral, They Probably
Are Not Sufficiently Narrowly Tailored
Even content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected
speech must be narrowly tailored to promote "a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." 247 In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,248 the Supreme Court noted that "this standard does not mean
that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech

240. Id.
241. Interestingly, the Court in Heffron explicitly declined to reach the question of whether two similar
purposes that had been advanced by the government were constitutionally sufficient to support the law in
question. As stated, these interests were to "protect fairgoers from being harassed or otherwise bothered, on
the grounds that they are a captive audience," and to "protect citizens from fraudulent solicitations, deceptive
or false speech and undue annoyance." Heffron, 452 U.S. 640, and see note 13.
242. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 792, in which a guideline was upheld "because it had nothing to do with
content." See also Part V, for a proposed statute which serves these purposes without reference to a particular
kind of speech.
243. Id.
244. Young, 903 F.2d at 159. As was noted on page 190, other courts have not followed the Young
decision.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799; quoting U.S. v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
248.

Ward, 491 U.S. 781.
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than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests," 25 adding that
the "[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a manner that a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals."" 0
In L.A. City Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent,2 51 the Supreme Court found that
a prohibition against posting signs on public property was narrowly tailored
because it "eliminate[d] the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy," 2 2 i.e.
signs causing "visual clutter and blight," and "curtail[ed] no more speech than
was necessary to accomplish its purpose." ' In Frisby v. Schultz,2" the Supreme
Court upheld a ban prohibiting picketing an individual's home because the statute

was narrowly tailored to eliminate the exact source of the "evil of targeted
255
residential picketing," which "is created by the medium of expression itself,"
and did not otherwise impinge on speech.
Very few cases have invalidated a statute on narrow tailoring grounds. However,
in CCNV v. Turner, Judge Mikva, of the D.C. Circuit, struck down a Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) regulation that prohibited "the
organized exercise of rights and privileges which deal with political, religious or
social matters and are non-commercial" without a permit.25 The Court held that
the requirement "fails the narrow tailoring inquiry" because, "[a]lthough
WMATA's stated interests are achieved more effectively with the regulation than
without it, the permit requirement also restricts many incidents of free expression
that pose little or no threat to WMATA's ability to provide safe and efficient
transportation and an equitably available forum for public expression.""a 7 The
court contrasted this case with Ward v. Rock Against Racism,2" noting that the
WMATA regulation "arguably eliminate[d] the 'sources of evil' that allegedly
threaten WMATA's ability to provide a safe and efficient transportation system"
but did so "at too high a cost, namely, by significantly restricting a substantial
25
quantity of speech that does not impede WMATA's permissible goals."

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 799.
Id.
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Id. at 808.
Id. at 810.
Frisby, 487 U.S. 474.
Id. at 487
Id. at 1392.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Ward, 491 U.S 781.
Community for Creative Non-Violence. 893 F 2d at 1391.
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Sections (a) through (h) 26 0 of the District's new law also fail the "narrowly
tailored" requirement because even if they promote the substantial government
interests of eliminating the "evils" associated with aggressive and passive
panhandling, such as hassling, annoying, interfering with, defrauding, frightening
and intimidating passersby, which would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation,261 they do so by burdening substantially more speech than is necessary.
Some sections of the panhandling law are vague 26 2 and leave the police and the
courts with fuzzy and indefinite definitions of the conduct to be prohibited. Several
sections of the law are also overbroad 263 and chill the exercise of protected speech
and expressive conduct. These failings, which are described more fully elsewhere,
offer additional arguments that the statute is not narrowly tailored.
2. Even if the Statutes' Restriction Are Content- Neutral, Some Sections Do
Not Leave Open Ample Alternative Means of Communication
The final component of the test to determine the constitutionality of time, place,
and manner restrictions on protected speech is whether the restriction leaves open
*"ample alternative means of communication." 2 With respect to the ban on
aggressive begging, this element probably is met because non-aggressive begging is
permitted in most public and designated public fora. With regard to passive
begging and related conduct, however, the ample alternative means test is not met
in some sections of the District's panhandling law.
Section (b) states that "no person may ask, beg or solicit alms205 in any public
transportation vehicle, or at any bus, train, or subway station or stop.1200 This
section prohibits the whole range of speech and expressive conduct associated with
passive begging, as well as any other activity done "with the intention of obtaining
an immediate donation, ' 28 7 such as playing the lute or singing gospel songs.
Prohibition of such activity "at any bus. . .or subway. . .stop" fails the "ample
alternative channels" test here, just as the WMATA regulations challenged in

D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312 (Supp. 1994).
261. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
262. See discussions on pages 218 and 226.
263. See discussion beginning on page 224.
264. Id. at 802.
265. Id.
266. Section (2) of the statute defines begging to "include[]. . . such other act conducted for the
purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or thing of value.
267. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3311(2) (Supp. 1994).
260.
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CCNV v. Turner did. There, the court held that the test was not met because "no
intra-forum alternative" was made available for protected free speech activities.203
Here, also, no "intra-forum alternative" is available.
In CCNV v. Turner, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of Section
100.10(g), but rather remanded it for further factual development. Section
100.10(g) prohibited all free speech "activities [which] include chanting, dancing,
shouting, outcries or use of any device for voice amplification or any other sound
device, including musical instrument in the above ground areas of Metro."'' cD
Ultimately, WMATA entered a Stipulation of Settlement with plaintiffs, in June
of 1993, and agreed not to enforce this prohibition?.7
Section (b) of the panhandling law is so broadly written that it includes similar
prohibitions against the use of musical instruments and the like for the purpose of
obtaining donations. The government's interests, (or WMATA's) now, as at the
time of the CCNV case in 1990, are to provide safe and efficient transportation . 7
These interests are not impeded by peaceful musicians and others exercising their
First Amendment rights in the above ground areas at Metro stations and stops. 2
In fact, WMATA Regulations expressly permit free speech activities fifteen (15)
feet from any escalator in the above ground areas of Metro.2 7 3 The statute should
be modified to permit these free speech activities in this intra-forum alternative
since all such activities are forbidden in all other portions of the Metro system.
Sections (c) through (h) appear to permit alternative channels for
communication and thus pass constitutional muster on this score. However, there
are several remaining concerns with the District's panhandling law.
D. The Statute's Definitions of "Aggressive Manner" are Flawed
In Section 22-3312, the District's statute bans begging in an "aggressive
manner," a phrase it defines in four subsections, 22-3311 (1)(A)-(D). These
definitions are unconstitutional and otherwise deficient and should be amended

268.
169.

Community for Creative Non-Violence. 893 F.2d at 1393.
Id. at 1389.

t. ) Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Gunn. Stipulation, C.A. No. 88-1048-55. Section 2, page
2, June 24, 1993, filed with the court July 2. 1993.
271. Communityfor Creative Non-Violence. 893 F.2d. at 1391.
272. Id.
273. § 100.10(d), WMATA Regulations.
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in several significant ways.174
I. Section 22-3311 (1)(A) defines "aggressive manner" as follows:
Approaching, speaking to, or following a person in a manner as would cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act
upon the person, or upon property in the person's immediate possession.
This section is vague, in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson175 held that the "voidfor-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." 27 6 The Court emphasized the "requirement that a legislature
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. . .[because] [w]here the
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit
'astandardless sweep [which] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections.' ",277 Further, in reviewing a law involving free speech,
the "general test of vagueness applies with particular force"' 7 8 and "[s]tricter
27
standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied. 0
Section 22-3311(l)(A)'s "reasonable person" standard is vague because it
specifies no knowable minimal standard of conduct which would "give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by
statute. 2 80 This vagueness is exacerbated by Section 8 of the statute, which allows
warrantless arrests of "aggressive" panhandlers if the police officer "has probable
cause to believe that the person has committed or is committing an offense" under

274. See infra Section IV for an alternative statute which addresses these concerns.

275. 461 U.S. 352. 357 (1982).
276. See Bevier, RehabilitatingPublic Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 80 Sup. CT.REv. 81
(1992) ("The Court used the vagueness doctrine to compel public forum decision makers to specify their
regulatory needs, to tailor their regulations to the particular locus, to announce the regulations clearly In
advance, and to avoid aiming their prohibitions explicitly at disfavored viewpoints."). Id. at 85.
277. Id. at 358.
278. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976).
279. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) ("...a man may the less be required to act at his
peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.") See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); In Re J.A., 601 A.2d 70, 73 (D.C. 1991); Willcher v. U.S., 408 A.2d 67,
72 (D.C. 1979).
280. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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the act. In essence, Section 22-3311 (1)(A) prohibits any speech or conduct that an
individual police officer believes would make a "reasonable person" fear for his
safety or that of his property, and it requires this officer to make arrests on that
basis.28 1 What constitutes reasonable fear to one person may simply not to another
person and may well depend on the tolerance level,a28 life experience, mood, or
attitude of the persons enforcing the statute or the persons to whom such conduct
is directed.
In Terrell v. United States, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected the use of such a
subjective standard in the context of the District's Assault Statute.2a The Court
held that an objective standard was better because it focused attention "squarely
on the menacing conduct of the accused and his purposeful design either to
engender fear in or do violence to his victim."' '
The problem with applying a subjective standard like the one in Section 223311(1)(A) of the panhandling statute is illustrated by Mihas v. U.S.,"" a recent
D.C. Court of Appeals case. There, Judge William C. Pryor argued in his dissent
that the court in effect had applied a subjective standard in an "Assault with
Intent to Frighten" case. Judge Pryor observed:
In an urban setting which includes a diverse range of many different types of
people, it is undoubtedly true that appellant, a homeless person, and the
complainant, a resident of an affluent section of the city, had a harsh
280
encounter in an alley.
Judge Pryor concluded that because the court focused more attention on the
perceptions of the complainant than on the mens rea of the appellant, "an
unfortunate argument between two citizens [was] transformed into three criminal
convictions.112s2 Such results are inevitable if the subjective standard in Section 223311(1)(A) of the panhandling statute is applied, because police officers will have
to determine whether a beggar's conduct is criminal based on. the officer's
281. US. v. Smith, Memorandum Opinion, at 5. Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Satterfield, J. (September 9, 1993) (striking down the District's Temporary Anti-Stalking Law in part as
unconstitutionally vague).
282. 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
283. 361 A.2d 202 (1976); citing D.C CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1981).
284. Id. at 206. (emphasis added).
285. 618 A.2d 197 (D.C. 1992).
286. Id. at 202.
287. Id. The conviction for "Assault with Intent to Frighten" was upheld based on sufficient cmidene.
The majority opinion did not address the subjective or objective nature of the standard applied.
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perception of the reactions of a wide range of individuals, including those who are
old and young, rich and poor, from both urban and rural areas, and of various
ethnic and racial backgrounds.
In Coates v. Cincinnati,""' the Supreme Court struck down an unconstitutionally
vague statute that prohibited "annoying" conduct by people gathered on a public
sidewalk. The Court noted that "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not
annoy others." 289 The failure of the legislature to provide "fair notice of the
offending conduct" may "encourage arbitrary arrests and convictions.' a2
Similarly Section 22-3311(1)(A) of the act contains no understandable standards
"to assist citizens, courts, judges, or police personnel to define what conduct is
prohibited."2 91
The District of Columbia courts have been quite willing to strike down statutes
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Most recently, in a Memorandum Opinion
dated September 9, 1993, Judge Satterfield, of the Superior Court, struck down
the District's Temporary Anti-Stalking Law as vague because "the statute
contain[ed] no guidelines to govern the police and prosecutors in enforce[ment]
and juries in considering the fate of persons charged under the statute," and,
because under the statute, "law enforcement personnel are left to their own
2 '92
subjective interpretations.
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner,293 Judge Mikva found that
a Metro regulation requiring that "free speech activities" be conducted in a
"conversational tone" was unconstitutionally vague because the "lack of precision"
in the term would provide enforcement personnel with "an impermissibly wide
discretionary range in which to determine who is in violation." 2 The judge
highlighted the fact that the standard "would likely chill legitimate exercises of
free speech, as a person of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning." 2 95
Furthermore, in Ricks v. District of Columbia,2 98 the D.C. Circuit Court struck
288. 402 U.S. 611.
289. Id.
290. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
291. People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985) (striking down a harassment statute as
unconstitutionally vague).
292. U.S. v. Smith, Memorandum Opinion at 4-5 (statute vague because terms "emotional distress" and
"harassing" undefined).
293. 893 F.2d at 1395.
294. Id.
295. Id.: quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
296. 414 F.2d 1097, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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down the District's vagrancy statute as unconstitutionally vague because the
provision, which required a suspect to "give a good account of himself" to the
police, left "too much discretion in the hands of the police and the courts."
Section 22-3311(1)(A) invites a pattern of arbitrary police enforcement directed
against the poor and homeless who must seek alms from others. This is exactly the
kind of law enforcement that the Fifth Amendment void-for-vagueness prohibition
was designed to prevent:
The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic,
littering streets, committing assaults or engaging in countless other forms of
anti-social conduct. It can do so through the enactment and enforcement of
ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be
prohibited. .

.

.It cannot constitutionally do so through the enactment and

may entirely depend upon
enforcement of an ordinance whose violation
203
annoyed.
is
officer
police
a
not
whether or
(A) is already prohibited
Finally, the conduct prohibited in Section 22-331 (1)
by D.C. Code Ann §22-504, "Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing
Manner," which, as noted supra, includes a much preferred objective standard.
Consequently, Section 22-3311(l)(A) of the District's Aggressive Panhandling
Law should be struck down because of its constitutional defects and because it is
redundant and unnecessary.
II. Section 22-3311 (1)(B) defines "aggressive manner" as follows:
touching another person without that person's consent in the course of asking
for alms.
Under this section, to touch a person without consent while begging, regardless of
intent,2 " brevity, or the place on the body or clothing where the touching occurs, is
a criminal offense.
Like its sister Section 22-331 l(l)(A), Section 22-331 l(1)(B), as well as conduct
297. Id.
298. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Panhandling
Charges, on behalf of Willie D. Williams, Case No. D 3504-93. p.! 1. attorney Paul Kollmer (case pending),
quoting Coates, 402 U.S. at 614.
299. See discussion of overbreadth infra at pp. 223-224. Similarly here, the lack of specific intent
requirement permits punishment for otherwise innocent conduct.
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more appropriately described as "aggressive," is already prohibited by D.C. Code
§22-1121, "Disorderly Conduct."300 which makes it a crime to act in a manner as
to "annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others" or to
"interfere with any person in any place by jostling against such a person or
unnecessarily crowding him [or her] .

,,c Section 22-3311(1)(B) of the

statute is redundant and unnecessary, and it fails constitutional muster.
III. Section 22-3311 (1)(C) defines "aggressive manner" as follows:
"Aggressive manner" means: Continuously asking, begging, or soliciting alms
from a person after the person has made a negative response."
A basic function of the First Amendment is "to invite dispute, 302 yet if a beggar
receives a "negative response" of any kind after one request for alms, section 223311(1)(C) silences him or her with the fear of criminal penalty. The First
Amendment protects the "right to speak freely and to promote diversity of
ideas."303 The Supreme Court in TerminielloG4 said that free speech "may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger...";
consequently, it is "protected against. . .punishment unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."3 0 A second request for alms, while
possibly annoying, may also serve to change the heart and mind of a listener on
issues ranging from the plight of the individual beggar to the availability and
effectiveness of government programs for the poor. To silence the beggar as the
discussion gets underway is to deny that speaker his or her opportunity to
persuade, to engage, to enlighten, and to otherwise attempt to reach passersby.
This section not only violates the First Amendment, but infringes on the
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection as well. All other speakers are

300. As such, this section violates the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because it
"discriminates between lawful and unlawful conduct based on the content of communication. Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
301. See also comments submitted to the D.C. Council by the Public Defender Service for the District
of Columbia, Baillargeon, July 24, 1991. (on file with D.C. L REV).
302. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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free to ask questions continuously on any other topic from politics, to sports, to
religion despite negative responses. Only the beggar, seeking alms, must be silent
after receiving a "negative response." This section "discriminates between lawful
and unlawful conduct based on the content of . . . communication,"0 and
"completely undercut[s] the 'profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.' "0o7 Under
this section the beggar forfeits the guaranteed equal protection of the law, and
consequently Section 22-3311(l)(C) should be struck down.
IV.

Section 22-3311(I)(D) defines "aggressive manner" as follows:

"intentionally blocking or interfering with the safe or free passage of a person
by any means, including unreasonably causing a person to take evasive action
to avoid physical conduct."
The conduct prohibited in this section is already covered by D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-1107, "Incommoding," if engaged in by three or more persons, and by D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-1121 "Disorderly Conduct," if engaged in by one or more
persons. 3° While this section is therefore unnecessary, it comes closer than the
other sections to describing conduct that actually may be aggressive. A statute
with similar language was upheld in City of Seattle v. Webster.3° The court found
that the "inclusion in the ordinance of the element of specific intent save[d] it
from being unconstitutionally overbroad" in that it sufficiently "narrow[ed] the
scope" of the prohibited conduct to avoid punishment for innocent conduct that
"merely consequentially" resulted in the blocking of pedestrian or vehicular
traffic. 10 Similarly, the court found that the specific intent element also saved the
ordinance from unconstitutional vagueness since it "distinguish [ed] between
conduct calculated to harm-intentionallyinterfering with pedestrian or vehicular
traffic, and conduct which is essentially innocent-unintentionallyinterfering with
306. Carey v. Brown, 447 US. 460, n. 176.
307. Police Department of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 US. 92, 95 (1972); quoting New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270.
3
308. See ACLU, Letter of June 1, 1993, p. (on file with DC L REv)
. [that pcrsonl
309. 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990); "a person is guilty of pedestrian interference if..
intentionally: I) obstructs pedestrian or vehicular traffic," which is defined as, "to walk. stand, sit. lie or place
an object in such a manner as to block passage by another person or a vehicle, or to require another porson or
a driver to take evasive action to avoid physical contact." Id. at 1337; quoting SMC 12A.12.015(B)(1) and
(A)(3), respectively.
310. Id. at 1338.
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traffic by merely being present upon a public sidewalk."311 The court focused on
the fact that, with the special intent requirement, the ordinance "define[d] the
proscribed conduct solely in reference to the person interfering with the flow of
. . . traffic," rather than "bas[ing] criminality on the reaction of others to the
312
presence of a person on the public sidewalks."
Section 22-3311(l)(D) of the panhandling law includes a specific intent
requirement and, as a result, will probably pass constitutional muster. This is the
kind of provision that the court in Loper 1 - may have had in mind when it
suggested that a ban on aggressive begging rather than begging, in general, would
probably survive scrutiny-because "alternative means of protecting the message
exist,"' such as non-aggressive begging in most public fora.
E. Section 22-3312 of the Statute Contains Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Provisions
The District's statute is designed to prohibit or regulate conduct defined as "to
ask, beg or solicit alms, includ[ing] the spoken, written, or printed word or such
act conducted for the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of money or
thing of value."31 3 This statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because "it sweeps
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an
exercise of freedom of speech ...
"I"
In describing the justification for the overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court
has observed that "[t]he existence of such statute[s], which readily lend . . .
[themselves] to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a
continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might
317
reasonably be regarded as within its purview.
The District's statute includes charitable solicitation within its purview. 313
Commentator Robert Teir has opined that one way in which an anti-begging
statute might be drafted with excessive broadness would be if instead of specifying

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. at 1339. (emphasis in original).
Id.
802 F. Supp. 1029, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Id.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3311(2) (Supp. 1994).
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 798; quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
Id.
But see discussion on pp. 204-05.
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"begging" or "panhandling," the statute "prohibited 'solicitation' or another broad
term of that sort," since charitable solicitation has been constitutionally protected
in the past "because of its connection to a variety of important community
interests ..

."810

Several examples will illustrate the broad reach of the D.C. statute in making
criminal this constitutionally protected activity. Section (a) applies to those who
wish to solicit for charity in an "aggressive manner" in public and designated
public fora including sidewalks, streets, parks, and the like. Thus, an individual
who "touch[es] another person without that person's consent ' 'a o or makes a
second request after receiving a negative response while soliciting funds to support
cancer research is subject to arrest under the statute.
Section (c) prohibits passive solicitors for charity from doing so on a sidewalk
within ten feet of an ATM machine. Section (g) prohibits fundraising for charity
by washing or cleaning cars parked on the street.
The statute also includes within its purview street musicians and other
performers who work in public areas "with the intention of obtaining an
immediate donation. 'a21 These individuals also are subject to criminal prosecution
if, for example, they touch another person without consentan during a performance
or, presumably, if they continue to perform after a passerby shakes her head no.a
Section (d) prohibits the performance of such conduct with the intention of
obtaining a donation from "any operator or occupant of a motor vehicle that is in
traffic on a public street. ' 3 4 The criminal conduct need not include any overt
request. Thus, a street musician or performer who plays within sight of traffic is
subject to arrest if a passenger in a car tosses a quarter into the performer's guitar
case even if no interference with traffic occurs.
The statute is so sweeping that it "has the potential to repeatedly chill the
exercise of expressive activity by many individuals."8' 25 The expansive language
and reach of the statute increase this potential because the law conceivably
prohibits so many kinds of constitutionally protected speech and conduct. As the

319. Teir, supra note 30, at 48; citing Shaumburg, 440 US. at 620.
320. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3311(B) (Supp. 1994).
321. Some street musicians and performers correctly consider their efforts as services performed for fees
rather than as "asking, begging or soliciting for alms." but they are still prosecuted under this statute. See,
e.g.. D.C. v. McFarin and Taylor. infra note 337.
322. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3311(B) (Supp. 1994).
323. Id. § (C).
324. D.C. CODE ANN § 22-3312(d) (Supp. 1994).
325. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982).
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Supreme Court said in Baggett v. Bulitt,3
. . . indefinite language, avoid the risk

"Those sensitive to the perils posed by

. . .

only by restricting their conduct to

'27
that which is unquestionably safe. Free Speech may not be so inhibited.
The overbreadth of the statute is both real and substantial when "judged in

relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep." 28 It is an over-inclusive response to the
government's interest in prohibiting or regulating panhandling and, as such, it
violates the First Amendment."' 9
F. Section 22-3312(b) Of The Statute Is Unconstitutionally Vague
Section 22-3312(b) is unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied,
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.330 The phrase "at a . . .
station or stop,.... lacks precision,"331 and does not "give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his conduct is forbidden by statute."'3 3 Because of
traffic and parking violators, buses may stop along the sidewalk anywhere within a
half block of the sign identifying the bus stop. In addition, bus shelters are often
located at some distance from where buses stop. The average person has no way of
knowing which part of this sidewalk, or public forum, is "at a bus stop" and
therefore has no fair notice of the scope of the prohibition in this section. Because
a person "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the] meaning of the
statute,"3 3 the standard will chill the legitimate exercise of free speech rights. The
average person is prevented for fear of arrest from opening his hand, or hat or flute
case, in hopes of securing some change with which to pay bus fare or buy dinner.
Similarly, at the above ground areas surrounding Metro stations, many times it
is impossible to tell where the sidewalk begins and Metro property ends, as the
Court specifically noted in CCNV v. Turner.334 Many of the above ground areas of
Metro are easily mistaken for plazas owned by the building overhead or for open
areas provided by the government for a broad set of public purposes. The lack of
precision in the statute gives those enforcing this provision "an impermissibly wide

326. 377 U.S. 360. 372 (1964).
327. Id.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
Id. at 615.
See supra discussion beginning on page 224.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 893 F.2d at 1395.
Id.

333. Id.
334.

Id.; quoting Connally, 269 U.S. 385, 391.
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discretionary range in which to determine who is in violation."'-s" In addition, as in
CCNV v. Turner, the prohibition "sweeps widely, burdening substantially more
speech than is necessary to guarantee WMATA's safe and efficient operation."'
The prohibitions against passive begging and other activities conducted to obtain a
donation are unnecessary to achieve the government's interests and thus "tread
unnecessarily on First Amendment guarantees.1'as3
Already, several musicians, like Philip Smallwood described in the preface of
this article,m have been arrested and charged under the aggressive panhandling
statute because they were playing instruments and singing near a subway stop with
the hope of obtaining donations. In fact, many were playing music with cups
displayed in the above ground areas of Metro from eleven"' to twenty feet3 4 0 from
the escalators leading down into the metro station. Because of the lack of precision
in the statute, these individuals were not given fair notice that their conduct was
prohibited by the statute. The statute is unconstitutional as applied to them and to
others similarly situated.
Further, in passing this law, the D.C. Council did not intend to prohibit
musicians from working in public areas. Councilmember James Nathanson,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Council, admitted as much in a
recent interview about the arrest of street musicians under this statute. He stated
that "[this law was not designed to cover musicians playing in any space" because
such "people who render a service are not asking for handouts" and so are not
"asking for alms but doing nothing in return."3 4 1
It is important to note that the legislative history of this section makes clear that
the Council intended for the law to prohibit begging only in the below-ground
areas of metro stations, where people would be a "captive audience."34' This is in
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See supra discussion beginning on page 179.
339. See D.C. v. McFarlin and Taylor, Crim. Nos. D-3616-93 and D 3617-93. "Motion Pursuant to
Rule 117(g) to Review and Reverse Judgment of Hearing Commissioner," p.5. filed Feb. 10. 1994.
340. Affidavit of Philip Smallwood, p. I (on file %%ith DC L REv).
341. John Murawski, It's
Not Music to the City's Ears. LEGAL Ti tEs. Dec. 13. 1993. at p. 6
342. See supra note 15. When the Judiciary Committee met on May 12. 1993. to discuss the
Panhandling Act, the Act contained an earlier version of Section 3(b) which provided that "[nlo person may
ask, beg or solicit alms
at any subway station or stop within five (5) feet of the grounds on which any
. . subway station or stop is located. Jud. Comm Tr at 8. 20-24. During the meeting. Councilmember Ray
moved that the "within five (5) feet' limitation be deleted from the end of Section 3 (b) bzcausc he had
"problems with saying that someone cannot panhandle within five (5) feet of a . .subway station or a bus
stop [and was] troubled by that." Id. at 21. Mr. Ray recalled that Metro "tried to prevent [him). and (he was
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accord with the First Amendment, which "permits the government to prohibit

offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience can not avoid the
objectionable speech."' 3
Section 22-3312(b) of the panhandling statute is unnecessary because WMATA
Regulations already prohibit the unwanted conduct. " ' If additional criminal
sanctions are deemed necessary, at a minimum, this section of the statute should
be amended to specify below ground areas of the Metro system in accordance with
the panhandling statute's intended purpose. This change would eliminate the
Constitutional violation in the statute as written.

IV.

A.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATION TO CURE CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER
DEFECTS INTHE STATUTE

Purposes of the Proposed Statute

The alternative statute proposed cures the constitutional and other defects in the
District's "Panhandling Control Act of 1993." This legislation complements
without duplicating the many existing statutes that already prohibit or regulate a
wide range of conduct in public and non-public places. 3 "5 Specifically, it enables
the government of the District of Columbia to protect individuals from aggressive
as well as fraudulent conduct not already addressed by statute, in public places, in
traffic, and while using ATM machines. No effort has been made to duplicate
existing prohibitions of illegal conduct associated with the Metro system since
WMATA Regulations are in place and are effective.
The net effect of the proposed statute is to broaden the scope of the conduct
prohibited by the government to include all aggressive and unwanted interference

sure] others, from passing out... handbills at the Metro stops. [He thought Metro had] stopped trying to do
that, but [he didn't] think that [the Council] should stop someone who... askled] someone for a quarter
[within five (5) feet of a Metro stop]." Id. at 20. When Chairman Nathanson explained that the reason for
the "within five (5) feet" limitation was to prevent a "captive audience" situation. Mr. Ray responded that "if
it's not aggressive then it shouldn't be a problem." Id. at 23. The Committee then voted to delete the "within
five (5) feet" limitation. Id. at 24.
343. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487, referring also to Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980), and cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.. 463 U.S. 60. 72 (1983).
344. See supra note 217, and accompanying discussion.
345. The Council, in its oversight capacity, may want to investigate the extent to which existing statutes
are being enforced. If they are not, the Council may want to take appropriate action to encourage more
enforcement.
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in public places, rather than just that associated with begging. Penalties provided
are minimal in keeping with the nature of the offenses, with the recognition that
those arrested are likely to be poor and without resources, and, with the District's
current concern over its overcrowded prison population. The goal is to promote and
maintain civility in public spaces without unduly impinging on protected free
speech activities.
B. Proposed Statute
SECTION 1, DEFINITIONS.

For the purpose of this act
(1) The term "Aggressive manner" means:

(A) Intentionally intimidating or threatening any person without that
person's consent;

(B) Intentionally blocking or impeding the safe or free passage of a
person in a public area, or a driver or occupant of a motor vehicle, by any
means including unreasonably causing a person to take evasive action to
avoid physical contact.
(2) The term "Services" means:
(A) Blocking, occupying or reserving a public parking space or directing
the operator or occupant to a public parking space;
(B) Cleaning motor vehicle windows while the vehicle is in traffic on a
public street;
(C) Protecting, watching, washing, cleaning, repairing, or painting a
motor vehicle or bicycle while it is parked on a public street, in return for
money or any other thing of value.
(3) The term "Public Area" means:
(A) Any place open to the general public and not owned privately
including sidewalks, streets, alleys, driveways, parking lots, parks, plazas,
buildings, doorways and entrances to and the grounds enclosing
buildings.
SECTION

2,

PROHIBITED ACTS.

(A) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand the purchase or sale of
goods or services, in an aggressive manner, in a public area, in return for
money or thing of value.
(B) It shall be unlawful for any person to act in an aggressive manner
toward another person or persons in a public area.
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(C) It shall be unlawful to act in an aggressive manner, toward any
person or persons using or attempting to use an Automatic Teller
Machine (ATM).
SECTION 3 PENALTIES.
(A) Any person convicted of violating any provision of Section 2 shall be
fined not more than $50 or be imprisoned not more than one (1)day.
(B) In lieu of the penalty provided in subsection (a) of this section, a
person convicted of violating any provision of Section 2 may be required
to perform community service as provided in D.C. CODE ANN §16-712.
4 CONDUCT OF PROSECUTIONS.
Prosecutions for violations of this Act shall be conducted in the name of the
District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel.
SECTION

V.

CONCLUSION

On November 22, 1993, the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless released
a scathing report entitled, Cold, Harsh, and Unending Resistance: the District of
Columbia Government's Hidden War Against Its Poor and Its Homeless. 4 ' This
study describes more than thirty (30) lawsuits brought by poor and homeless
residents against the District, challenging the government's failure to provide
adequate "homeless shelters, public housing, emergency assistance, food stamps,
medical benefits, school transportation for foster care, prisons, mental health
services and juvenile facilities. ' 3 47 The conditions described in these cases are
appalling and they are not improving. The District estimates that 8,000 to 10,000
District residents are now homeless 48 and over twenty percent (20%) of all
49
District residents live in poverty.
Unfortunately, the District is only one of many large cities with insufficient
funding or commitment to meet the needs of growing numbers of homeless and
below poverty-level residents. Cities have responded to this situation increasingly
by passing a variety of new laws criminalizing a range of often pathetic activities

346. Edited by Greenberger, Brown and Bowden.
347. Id. at p. 6.
348. Id. at p. 327. quoting the D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development
Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy of the District of Columbia 1992-1996. at 14.
349. Id.: quoting Number of Poor Americans Rises for 3rd Year. WASH POST, Oct. 5.1993. at A6
(citing 1992 census figures).
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engaged in by poor people who are trying to secure basic survival needs.
In December of 1993, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty
published The Right To Remain Nowhere; A Report On Anti-Homeless Laws and
Litigation In 16 United States Cities.so This study catalogs the national trend in
"hostile" local government laws and actions that are "directed against homeless
men, women and children." ' A sampling of these new laws and actions includes
those designed or used to keep homeless people out of public areas, "pedestrian
interference" ordinances; prohibitions and restrictions on sleeping in public places;
neighborhood "sweeps" specifically aimed to drive homeless people from certain
public places; restrictions on transit system areas, and laws "prohibiting begging,
• . . impeding the flow of traffic, littering, public drunkenness, breaking park
curfews, and refusing to present identification."152 The District's new panhandling
statute is featured prominently in the report.353
It is beyond the scope of this article to propose constructive responses to the core
societal problems that cause homelessness and, in turn, the natural response of
soliciting money. Rather it is the intent of this article, to recommend against the
adoption of more and more duplicative laws directed against survival activities of
poor and homeless people and, to encourage the District and other jurisdictions to
limit the nature and effect of existing statutes to those that are constitutionally
sound and not unduly inhibitive and punitive of the homeless population. 3 1
Nevertheless, lawmakers should not lose sight of what the author of The Right To
Remain Nowhere wisely states:
[c]riminalizing responses to homelessness are inhumane, do not solve the
problem and are - increasingly - subject to constitutional challenge.
350. Steve Berman undcrtook primary responsibility for updating and revising the National Law
Center's 1991 report. Go Directly to Jail: A Report Analyzing Local Anl.-Haneless Ordinances.

351. Id. at 6-7.
at iv.
352. Id.
353. Id.
at 118-126.
354. Each of the reports cited above make important substantive rccommendattons which should be
adopted and implemented. See the Washington Legal Clintc for the Homeless Report, at 325-335. and the
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty. at 129-140. There arc some important efforts underway.
The Clinton administration recently has proposed a set of antipoverty initiatives designed "to provide jobs.
combat homelessness. and revitalize low-income communities" with empowerment zones (Vobejda. Gore
unveils Antipoverty Strategy. WAsH. Posr. April I. 1994. at A3.) In addition. S20 million dollars has been
allocated by the Federal Government to end homelessness in the District of Columbia. by providing additional
permanent housing, drug treatment, job training, and mental health services. The first payment of S7 million
dollars was set for summer of 1994. (Brown, Initiative on the Line. WAsHt PosT. April 7. 1994. D.C..) These
efforts should result in a decrease in the numbers of beggars on D.C. streets.
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Expending resources to enact, enforce, and defend such responses in courts
fosters divisiveness, wastes scarce resources, and diverts effort from more
positive responses. Rather than penalizing their homeless residents, cities
should work constructively to address the problem of homeless.I "O

355.

Id. at vi.
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APPENDIX
The District of Columbia's Aggressive Panhandling Statute and other cited
statutes

§ 22-3311.

DEFINITIONS.

For the purpose of this chapter, the term:
(1) "Aggressive manner" means:
(A) Approaching, speaking to, or following a person in a manner as would
cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm or the commission of a criminal act
upon the person, or upon property in the person's immediate possession;
(B) Touching another person without that person's consent in the course of
asking for alms;
(C) Continuously asking, begging, or soliciting alms from a person after the
person has made a negative response; or
(D) Intentionally blocking or interfering with the safe or free passage of a
person by any means, including unreasonably causing a person to take evasive
action to avoid physical contact.
(2) "Ask, beg, or solicit alms" includes the spoken, written, or printed word or
such other act conducted for the purpose of obtaining an immediate donation of
money or thing of value.

§ 22-3312.

PROHIBITED ACTS.

(a) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms, including money and other things of
value, in an aggressive manner in any place open to the general public, including
sidewalks, streets, alleys, driveways, parking lots, parks, plazas, buildings,
doorways and entrances to buildings, and gasoline service stations and the grounds
enclosing buildings.
(b) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in any public transportation vehicle,;
or at any bus, train, or subway station or stop.
(c) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms within 10 feet of any automatic
teller machine (ATM).
(d) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms from any operator or occupant of a
motor vehicle that is in traffic on a public street.
(e) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms from any operator or occupant of a
motor vehicle on a public street in exchange for blocking, occupying, or reserving a
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public parking place, or directing the operator or occupant to a public parking
space.
(f) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in exchange for cleaning motor
vehicle windows while the vehicle is in traffic on a public street.
(g) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms in exchange for protecting,
watching, washing, cleaning, repairing, or painting a motor vehicle or bicycle while
it is parked on a public street.
(h) No person may ask, beg, or solicit alms on private property or residential
property, without permission from the owner or occupant.
§ 22-3313.

PERMITTED ACTIVITY.

Acts authorized as an exercise of a person's constitutional right to picket,
protest, or speak, and acts authorized by a permit issued by the District of
Columbia government shall not constitute unlawful activity under this chapter.

§ 22-3314.

PENALTIES.

(a) Any person convicted of violating any provision of § 22-3312 shall be fined
not more than $300 or be imprisoned not more than 90 days or both.
(b) In lieu of or in addition to the penalty provided in subsection (a) of this
section, a person is convicted of violating any provision of § 22-3312 may be
required to perform community service as provided in § 16-712.
§ 22-3315.

CONDUCT OF PROSECUTIONS.

Prosecutions for violations of this chapter shall be conducted in the name of
the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel.
§ 22-3316. DISCLOSURE.
Any arrest or conviction under this chapter shall be disclosed to public and
private social service agencies that request the Metropolitan Police Department or
the court to be notified of such events.
§ 23-581. ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.
(a)(1) A law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant having
previously been issued therefor --
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(C) a person who he has probable cause to believe has committed or is about
to commit any offense listed in paragraph (2) and, unless immediately arrested
may not be apprehended, may cause injury to others, or may tamper with, dispose
of, or destroy evidence; and
(D) a person whom he has probable cause to believe has committed any
offense which is listed in paragraph (3) of this section, if the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that, unless the person is immediately arrested, reliable evidence
of alcohol or drug use may become unavailable or the person may cause personal
injury or property damage.
(3) The offenses which are referred to in paragraph (1)(D) of this section are
the following offenses specified in the District of Columbia Traffic Act of 1925,
approved March 3, 1924 (43 Stat. 1119; D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-701 et seq.), and
listed in the following table:
(table omitted)
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EPILOGUE

Decisions in two important federal cases have been issued since this article was
submitted. First, in Roulette v. City of Seattle,' the court upheld an aggressive
begging ordinance but imposed a limiting construction to cure the statute's
overbroad inclusion of speech protected by the First Amendment. The court
construed the statute to prohibit only unprotected threatening words or conduct
which would make a reasonable person fearful of harm to person or property.2 The
court also struck, as both overbroad and vague, a section of the ordinance listing
"circumstances" which could be considered in determining the intent of the beggar
including "touching," "following," or "verbally abusing" the person solicited, or
"persisting in begging after a negative response." 3 Sections 22-3311 (1)(A)-(D) of
the District's statute are similarly unconstitutional, and should be struck down.'
In Patton v. Baltimore City,8 the court held that a statute nearly identical to the
District's statue did not violate the First Amendment because it satisfied "even the
high standards set by the Supreme Court for content-based restrictions of speech
in public fora." 8 The court described as compelling the government's interests in
protecting citizens and visitors from threatening, intimidating or harassing
behavior; promoting tourism and business; and in preserving the quality of urban
life7 - and, the court concluded that the statute was narrowly tailored to prohibit
only aggressive begging and left ample alternative channels of communication
since beggars were free to beg passively.'
Still, the court struck down the statute because it violated the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The court pointed out that the statute
discriminated between speakers by criminalizing the conduct only of solicitors with
a charitable purpose while permitting the aggressive solicitation for noncharitable
purposes such as radical political causes.' 0 The court held that the distinction
between charitable and non-charitable speakers was "murky" and did not satisfy
the Equal Protection requirement that such distinctions be finely tailored to serve
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

850 F. Supp. 1441 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
Id. at 1450.
Id. at 1451.
See infra, discussion beginning at 215.
F. Supp. Civil No. 93-2389, (D. Md.) Memorandum Op.. August 19, 1994.
Id., Memorandum Op. at 65.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65. See infra, discussion at 220.
Id. at 66.
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compelling government interests. The stated government interests in preventing
intimidation of downtown residents and visitors was simply not served by
exempting those who solicit for non-charitable purposes."1
These two cases illustrate the need for thoughtful legislative drafting, and an
authoritative decision by the Supreme Court regarding the spate of new begging
ordinances proliferating across the country.

11.Id.

